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ABSTRACT
For decades, the immigration adjudication system has been under
relentless attack from both the left and the right. The left has been
concerned with the fairness of the proceedings, the accuracy and
consistency of the outcomes, and the acceptability of both the
procedures and the outcomes to the parties and to the public. The
right has focused on the fiscal costs and elapsed times of these
proceedings. This Article demonstrates that all of these criticisms have
been well founded and that the roots of the problems are severe
underfunding, reckless procedural shortcuts, the politicization of the
process, and a handful of adjudicators personally ill suited to the task.
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Over the years, commentators and commissions have offered
thoughtful solutions, but consensus has proven elusive. This Article
calls for redesigning the entire system. For the trial phase, this Article
endorses previous proposals for converting the current immigration
judges into administrative law judges, who enjoy greater job security,
and moving them from the Department of Justice into a new,
independent executive branch tribunal. For the appellate phase, this
Article proposes radical surgery, replacing both administrative
appeals and regional court of appeals review with a single round of
appellate review by a new, Article III immigration court. The new
court would be staffed by experienced Article III district and circuit
judges serving two-year assignments. This new system would
significantly depoliticize the hiring, judging, supervision, and control
of immigration adjudicators. It would consolidate the two current,
largely duplicative rounds of appellate review into one, in the process
restoring the Article III jurisdiction that Congress stripped away in
1996. It would save tax dollars and speed the removal process, thus
reducing not only prolonged detention, but also what some believe is
a meaningful incentive to file frivolous appeals to delay removal. It
would preserve both specialized expertise and a generalist perspective.
And it is politically realistic, permitting all sides to meet the specific
objectives they hold most dear while requiring each side to make only
modest concessions.
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INTRODUCTION
Immigration law presents special complexities. The sheer size
and chaotic layout of the principal statute and related sources of law
bewilder specialists and nonspecialists alike. The labyrinth known as
1
the Immigration and Nationality Act governs the admission of
noncitizens to the United States, their expulsion from the United
States, and a host of miscellaneous decisions. Its five hundred pages
conspire with more than one thousand pages of administrative
2
regulations issued by a variety of federal departments, as well as
precedent decisions of administrative tribunals, executive officers,
and courts, to create a byzantine network of substantive and
procedural rules of law. The organization of the statute further
confounds nonspecialists because qualifications to many of its most
3
important provisions appear in distant and unexpected places.
1. Immigration and Nationality Act, Pub. L. No. 82-414, 66 Stat. 163 (1952) (codified as
amended at 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101–537 (2006)).
2. E.g., 6 C.F.R. (Department of Homeland Security); 8 C.F.R. (Department of Justice);
20 C.F.R. (Department of Labor); 22 C.F.R. (Department of State).
3. For example, the grounds on which a noncitizen may be deported are listed in 8 U.S.C.
§ 1227(a), but many of the provisions for discretionary relief in these cases are scattered
throughout the statute. See, e.g., id. §§ 1158, 1182(h), 1229b, 1229c, 1255, 1259. To receive
asylum, one must be a “refugee,” id. § 1158(b)(1)(A), but the term “refugee” is defined in
§ 1101(a)(42). The main requirements for the various classes of “nonimmigrant” temporary
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Moreover, even when the law is otherwise clear, rules that require
judges to apply broadly worded statutory or regulatory language to
4
individualized facts are exceptionally common, rendering outcomes
highly indeterminate.
The resulting legal complexities and fact-specific uncertainties, in
turn, generate disputes over the facts, the law, and the many
discretionary determinations delegated to a range of government
actors. The sheer number of noncitizens seeking admission or
5
resisting deportation, combined with the critical interests at stake for
both the individuals and the public, guarantee that the number of
disputes will be high.
This Article focuses on the formal system for adjudicating
removal cases. These are cases in which the government seeks either
to deny a noncitizen admission to the United States or to expel a
6
noncitizen after arrival. Described in Part I, these proceedings
visitors are laid out in § 1101(a)(15), but numerous other requirements for those same
admissions appear in § 1184.
4. Two of the most frequent remedies requested in removal proceedings, for example, are
asylum and cancellation of removal. The former requires a showing of “refugee” status, id.
§ 1158(b)(1)(A), which in turn requires a “well-founded fear of persecution,” id. § 1101(a)(42).
The latter requires a showing of “exceptional and extremely unusual hardship.” Id. § 1229b.
5. In fiscal year 2008, more than 1.1 million people were admitted to the United States as
lawful permanent residents, OFFICE OF IMMIGRATION STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND
SEC., 2008 YEARBOOK OF IMMIGRATION STATISTICS 5 tbl.1 (2009), available at http://www.dhs.
gov/xlibrary/assets/statistics/yearbook/2008/ois_yb_2008.pdf, and another 60,000 as refugees, id.
at 39 tbl.13. There were over 175 million “nonimmigrant” (temporary visitor) admissions. Id. at
65 tbl.25. In the same fiscal year, the immigration courts received more than 350,000 “matters,”
mainly removal proceedings. EXECUTIVE OFFICE FOR IMMIGRATION REVIEW (EOIR), U.S.
DEP’T OF JUSTICE, FY 2008 STATISTICAL YEAR BOOK B7 fig.2 (2009), available at http://www.
usdoj.gov/eoir/statspub/fy08syb.pdf.
6. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a. This is only one of several immigration adjudication systems that
Congress and the executive branch have constructed. United States Citizenship and
Immigration Services (USCIS), an agency of the Department of Homeland Security, engages in
informal adjudication when it decides a wide variety of individual applications for immigration
benefits, sometimes providing intra-agency appellate review of its decisions. See Homeland
Security Act of 2002 § 451, 6 U.S.C. § 271 (2006) (establishing the Bureau of Citizenship and
Immigration Services and detailing the functions of the agency and its officers); Notice of Name
Change from the Bureau of Citizenship and Immigration Services to United States Citizenship
and Immigration Services, 69 Fed. Reg. 60,938 (Oct. 13, 2004). The Department of Labor has its
own procedures for deciding—and offering review of its decisions denying—applications for
labor certification, a prerequisite to immigration in certain employment-related admission
categories. 8 C.F.R. § 212 (2009); 20 C.F.R. § 656 (2009). The State Department has procedures
for deciding visa applications and, in its discretion, reviewing visa denials by consular officers. 22
C.F.R. §§ 40–42 (2009). Several entities are involved in the adjudication of citizenship disputes.
See generally 7 CHARLES GORDON, STANLEY MAILMAN & STEPHEN YALE-LOEHR,
IMMIGRATION LAW AND PROCEDURE (rev. ed. 2009) (covering the law of nationality and
citizenship, and the process of naturalization). The USCIS asylum officers have procedures for
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comprise evidentiary hearings before immigration judges in the
Justice Department’s Executive Office for Immigration Review
(EOIR), appellate review by the Board of Immigration Appeals
(BIA), also within EOIR, and in certain cases, review by the U.S.
courts of appeals. Removal proceedings are the centerpiece, and by
far the most controversial, of the immigration adjudication systems in
place today. For decades, the system has been under relentless attack
from both the left and the right.
As this Article will show, the criticisms are well founded. There
have been fundamental problems with the fairness of the proceedings,
the accuracy and consistency of the outcomes, the efficiency of the
process (with respect to both fiscal resources and elapsed time), and
the acceptability of both the procedures and the outcomes to parties
and to the public. This Article argues that the principal sources of
these problems are severe underfunding, reckless procedural
shortcuts, the inappropriate politicization of the process, and a
handful of adjudicators personally ill suited to the task.
7
Over the years, commentators have offered thoughtful solutions,
but consensus has proved elusive. The various proposals have fallen
adjudicating certain asylum applications. 8 C.F.R. § 208. A truly comprehensive study of
immigration adjudication in the United States would embrace all of these disparate systems. As
a consultant to the Administrative Conference of the United States many years ago, I attempted
such an examination, but only with respect to the appellate phase. See Stephen H. Legomsky,
Forum Choices for the Review of Agency Adjudication: A Study of the Immigration Process, 71
IOWA L. REV. 1297 (1986). Much of that study has been overtaken by subsequent developments.
7. Several reports and other writings have recommended replacing EOIR with an Article
I immigration court that would have trial and appellate divisions. See APPLESEED, ASSEMBLY
LINE INJUSTICE: BLUEPRINT TO REFORM AMERICA’S IMMIGRATION COURTS 35–36 (2009),
available
at
http://www.chicagoappleseed.org/uploads/view/75/download:1/assembly_line_
injustice_june09.pdf; COMM’N ON IMMIGRATION, ABA, REFORMING THE IMMIGRATION
SYSTEM: EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 43–48 (2010), available at http://new.abanet.org/Immigration/
Documents/ReformingtheImmigrationSystemExecutiveSummary.pdf; JAYA RAMJI-NOGALES,
ANDREW SCHOENHOLTZ & PHILIP SCHRAG, REFUGEE ROULETTE: DISPARITIES IN ASYLUM
ADJUDICATION AND PROPOSALS FOR REFORM 103–04 (2009); SELECT COMM’N ON
IMMIGRATION & REFUGEE POLICY, U.S. IMMIGRATION POLICY AND THE NATIONAL
INTEREST: THE FINAL REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS 248–50 (1981); Peter J. Levinson, A
Specialized Court for Immigration Hearings and Appeals, 56 NOTRE DAME LAW. 644, 651–54
(1981); Dana Leigh Marks, An Urgent Priority: Why Congress Should Establish an Article I
Immigration Court, 13 BENDER’S IMMIGR. BULL. 3, 15–21 (2008); Maurice A. Roberts,
Proposed: A Specialized Statutory Immigration Court, 18 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1, 18–20 (1980);
Marshall Fitz & Philip Schrag, Proposed Bill to Create an Independent Immigration Court
System (2010) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Duke Law Journal); see also ABA,
DAILY JOURNAL: 2010 MIDYEAR MEETING (2010), available at http://www.abanet.org/
leadership/2010/midyear/docs/daily_journal.pdf (showing ABA House of Delegates approval of
Resolutions 114A, B, C, D, and F); Press Release, ABA, New Report to ABA Addresses Crisis
Within Immigration Removal System (Feb. 2, 2010), available at http://www.abanet.org/abanet/
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victim to structural impediments, funding priorities, and vast political
chasms that continue to separate the diverse clusters of critics.
This Article seeks to construct a politically realistic proposal that
would solve the major problems afflicting immigration adjudication.
To be politically feasible, the proposal must enable all sides to
achieve the legitimate goals they consider most important without
requiring any side to make more than modest concessions.
My proposal has two parts. The first part would convert current
immigration judges into administrative law judges (who enjoy greater
job security) and move them from the Department of Justice into a
new, independent tribunal. This new tribunal would remain within
the executive branch but would be located outside all departments of
the federal government. The second half of my proposal would
abolish both the BIA and the current role of the regional courts of
appeals, replacing them with a single round of appellate review by a
new, Article III immigration court. The new court would be staffed
by Article III judges drawn from the district courts and the regional
courts of appeals for two-year assignments. Only judges with at least
three years of experience on federal courts of general jurisdiction
would be eligible for such assignments.
It bears emphasis that restructuring, although essential to reform
of the immigration adjudication system, is not sufficient. Even a
perfect adjudication structure, staffed by perfect people, would solve
only a fraction of what ails immigration adjudication. As discussed
below, realistic funding is critical. There are, moreover, a number of
procedural issues that ideally require reform as well. Examples

media/release/news_release.cfm? releaseid=870 (summarizing the ABA Commission on
Immigration’s proposals); cf. Jaya Ramji-Nogales, Andrew I. Schoenholtz & Philip G. Schrag,
Refugee Roulette: Disparities in Asylum Adjudication, 60 STAN. L. REV. 295, 386 (2007)
(proposing conversion of the BIA to an Article I court). One study proposed the functional
equivalent of an Article I court with trial and appellate divisions, also within the executive
branch and outside the Department of Justice, but preferred not to call it a “court.” See U.S.
COMM’N ON IMMIGRATION REFORM, 1997 REPORT TO CONGRESS: BECOMING AN AMERICAN:
IMMIGRATION AND IMMIGRANT POLICY 178–82 (1997). Numerous other studies have criticized
core components of the EOIR adjudication system but without proposing specific restructuring
options. See, e.g., DORSEY & WHITNEY LLP, STUDY CONDUCTED FOR THE AMERICAN BAR
ASSOCIATION COMMISSION ON IMMIGRATION POLICY, PRACTICE AND PRO BONO RE: BOARD
OF IMMIGRATION APPEALS: PROCEDURAL REFORMS TO IMPROVE CASE MANAGEMENT
(2003), available at http://www.dorsey.com/files/upload/DorseyStudyABA_8mgPDF.pdf;
Sydenham B. Alexander III, A Political Response to Crisis in the Immigration Courts, 21 GEO.
IMMIGR. L.J. 1 (2006); Michele Benedetto, Crisis on the Immigration Bench: An Ethical
Perspective, 73 BROOK. L. REV. 467 (2008); Lenni B. Benson, You Can’t Get There from Here:
Managing Judicial Review of Immigration Cases, 2007 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 405.
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include the range of available remedies, access to counsel, the quality
of interpretation, standards of proof, and the rules concerning
8
motions to reopen or reconsider. For the most part, these issues are
beyond the scope of this Article. Though the distinction is not always
clear-cut, the emphasis here will be on the broad design of the system
rather than specific procedural ingredients.
Part I of this Article provides a bare-bones summary of the
current adjudication system for the removal of noncitizens from the
United States. Part II identifies and describes the fundamental
problems with the current system and seeks to diagnose their causes.
Part III articulates the essential principles that any reform would have
to follow to remedy the problems discussed in Part II. It then tests
some of the more significant proposals against those principles,
finding them to be improvements over the status quo but still not fully
satisfying. Part IV lays out the details of my proposed solution and
examines its benefits and costs.
I. THE BACKGROUND
Removal proceedings are the forum for determining whether
noncitizens should be removed from the United States, either upon
seeking admission (formerly called exclusion hearings) or after
admission (formerly called deportation hearings). The Department of
Homeland Security (DHS) initiates the proceedings by serving a
9
‘‘notice to appear’’ on the noncitizen whom it wishes to remove.
DHS is typically represented by an assistant chief counsel in
10
Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), an agency of DHS.
The noncitizen and DHS are the opposing parties. An immigration
11
judge conducts an evidentiary hearing.
The immigration judges, based in offices located throughout the
12
United States, are part of the Office of the Chief Immigration Judge
(OCIJ). The latter is a component of the Executive Office for

8. For a thoughtful discussion of the many external contributors to EOIR’s case
management problems, see generally Benson, supra note 7.
9. 8 U.S.C. § 1229(a)(1).
10. See E-mail from Peter Vincent, Principal Legal Advisor, Immigration and Customs
Enforcement, to Author (Aug. 19, 2009) (on file with the Duke Law Journal).
11. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(a)(1).
12. See EOIR, supra note 5, at B3 tbl.1 (listing office locations). Under the EOIR
“Institutional Hearing Program,” the immigration judges also conduct removal hearings in
prison facilities. Id. at P1.
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13

Immigration Review (EOIR), a tribunal within the Department of
Justice. The immigration judge first determines whether the
noncitizen is removable under any of the statutorily enumerated
14
15
grounds for inadmissibility or deportability. If the person is found
inadmissible or deportable, the immigration judge then decides any
affirmative applications for relief that the noncitizen has properly
16
filed. These latter determinations typically entail an initial decision
whether the person has met the specific statutory prerequisites for the
relief sought and, if so, whether discretion should be favorably
exercised. At the conclusion of the hearing, the immigration judge
17
renders a decision, either orally or in writing. The decision
culminates in a formal order directing the person’s removal,
18
terminating proceedings, or otherwise disposing of the case.
Among the mechanisms for affirmative relief are two remedies
designed specifically to protect the applicant from persecution:
asylum and a narrower remedy commonly called “withholding of
19
removal” (or, by statute, “restriction on removal”). Their
adjudication procedures require brief additional explanation. A
person who is already in removal proceedings may file a defensive
20
application for these remedies with the immigration judge. One who
is not in removal proceedings may file an affirmative application for
asylum (but not for withholding of removal) with the United States
21
Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS). If the asylum officer
is not prepared to grant the application, he or she refers the person

13. 8 C.F.R. §§ 1003.9–.10 (2009).
14. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a).
15. Id. § 1227(a).
16. See id. § 1229a(c)(4)(A).
17. 8 C.F.R. § 1240.13.
18. Id. § 1240.12(c).
19. Asylum, which is discretionary, enables the recipient to remain in the United States
and, subject to some limitations, to bring in a spouse and children. 8 U.S.C. § 1158. Withholding
of removal merely immunizes the person from return to the country in which his or her life or
freedom is threatened (not from return to a third country), and it makes no provision for the
admission of family members. See id. § 1231(b)(3).
20. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC. & U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, I-589, APPLICATION FOR
ASYLUM AND FOR WITHHOLDING OF REMOVAL: INSTRUCTIONS 10 (2009), available at http://
www.uscis.gov/files/form/i-589instr.pdf.
21. See id. at 11; EOIR, supra note 5, at I1.
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22

for removal proceedings, in which the person may apply de novo to
23
the immigration judge.
The Justice Department regulations give each of the opposing
parties the right to appeal the immigration judge’s decision to the
24
25
BIA, located in Falls Church, Virginia. The filing of the appeal
26
automatically stays execution of the immigration judge’s decision.
27
The attorney general created the BIA in 1940, names its members,
28
determines its procedures, and may review any of its decisions. Like
29
the immigration judges, the BIA is part of EOIR. As a result of
controversial reforms introduced in 2002 by Attorney General John
Ashcroft, the BIA decides the vast majority of its cases by single
members rather than multimember panels, and, in specified
30
categories, without providing reasons. The BIA reviews the
immigration judge’s legal conclusions and discretionary decisions de
novo, but as a result of the 2002 reforms, the BIA may not reverse
findings of fact, including credibility determinations, unless they are
31
“clearly erroneous.”
32
Subject to some broad exceptions enacted in 1996, the
noncitizen has the right to judicial review of the BIA’s decision. The
exclusive procedure for obtaining such review is a petition for review
in the United States court of appeals for the circuit in which the
33
removal hearing was held.
The three main classes of cases for which judicial review is
34
barred are expedited removal orders,
most discretionary
22. 8 C.F.R. § 208.14(c)(1) (assuming inadmissibility or deportability).
23. See DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC. & U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 20, at 10. EOIR
reports that in fiscal year 2008, immigration judges received over 33,000 such affirmative asylum
claims and 14,000 defensive claims. EOIR, supra note 5, at I1 fig.13.
24. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(b)(3).
25. EOIR, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Board of Immigration Appeals, http://www.justice.gov/
eoir/biainfo.htm (last visited Mar. 28, 2010).
26. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.6(a).
27. Regulations Governing Departmental Organization and Authority, 5 Fed. Reg. 3502,
3503 (Sept. 4, 1940) (codified as amended at 8 C.F.R. pt. 1003).
28. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1.
29. Id. § 1003.0(a).
30. See infra Part II.B.2.
31. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(d)(3).
32. For a summary of those restrictions, see Jill E. Family, Stripping Judicial Review
During Immigration Reform: The Certificate of Reviewability, 8 NEV. L.J. 499, 502–03 (2008).
33. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(2) (2006).
34. The statute authorizes immigration inspectors to order expedited removal when they
determine that arriving noncitizens at ports of entry are inadmissible because of either fraud or
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determinations, and most cases in which the noncitizens are
35
removable on crime-related grounds. The bar on review of most
discretionary decisions has had a particularly substantial impact
because, as the Justice Department has pointed out, “the dominant
36
number of the Board’s cases relate to . . . relief from removal.” The
collective consequence of these various bars on judicial review has
37
been that asylum cases (which are still reviewable) now make up the
38
bulk of the courts’ immigration caseloads. Service of the petition for
review does not automatically stay removal pending the court’s
decision, but upon motion by the noncitizen the court has the
39
discretion to grant a stay.
II. THE PROBLEMS
The United States immigration adjudication system is beset with
crippling problems. Immigration judges occupy positions of
unhealthy dependence within the Immigration and Naturalization
Service[,] . . . lack adequate support services, and frequently face
debilitating conflicts with agency personnel. Board of Immigration
Appeals members perform appellate functions without job security
or statutory recognition. Long delays pervade the quasi-judicial
hearing and appellate process. The availability of further review in
federal courts postpones finality, encourages litigation, and
40
undermines the authority of initial appellate determinations.

insufficient entry documents. In those cases the statute dispenses with several of the procedural
ingredients otherwise required in removal proceedings, and the process is designed to be fast.
Id. § 1225(b)(1).
35. Id. § 1252(a)(2).
36. Board of Immigration Appeals: Procedural Reforms to Improve Case Management, 67
Fed. Reg. 54,878, 54,880 (Aug. 26, 2002) (codified as amended at 8 C.F.R. pt. 1003); see also
EOIR, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, FACT SHEET: EOIR AT A GLANCE 2 (2009), available at http://
www.justice.gov/eoir/press/09/EOIRataGlance121409.pdf (“In most removal proceedings,
individuals admit that they are removable, but then apply for one or more forms of relief.”).
37. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii) (exempting relief under § 1158(a)—that is, asylum—
from the bar on judicial review of discretionary decisions).
38. Benson, supra note 7, at 425, 428; John R.B. Palmer, The Second Circuit’s “New
Asylum Seekers”: Responses to an Expanded Immigration Docket, 55 CATH. U. L. REV. 965, 966
(2006).
39. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(3)(B).
40. Levinson, supra note 7, at 644 (footnotes omitted).
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A. The Manifestations
Those words were written in 1981 by former congressional
counsel Peter Levinson. As this Section will demonstrate, the
problems have only grown. They have manifested themselves in
dubious and inconsistent outcomes; a lack of confidence in the results
felt by parties, reviewing courts, and commentators; an extraordinary
surge of requests for judicial review of the final administrative
decisions; substantial duplication of effort; and lengthy delays.
The generic goals of adjudication are a logical starting point for
gauging the effectiveness of the immigration adjudication system.
41
42
Roger Cramton has posited, and others have refined, three such
goals—accuracy, efficiency, and acceptability. I have suggested a
fourth goal—consistency—that overlaps substantially but not
43
completely with the other three. Measured against those goals, how
does the immigration adjudication system fare?
At a minimum, accuracy encompasses ultimate results that the
evidence and the relevant law reasonably support. Admittedly,
accuracy is hard to assess objectively. Errors are difficult to identify
when, as is true in removal cases, decisions frequently require
subjective judgments. Still, the unprecedented scathing criticisms that
so many U.S. courts of appeals have leveled at EOIR are
44
disconcerting. Lending both credibility and relevance to these
condemnations are two striking realities. First, the attacks come from
many different judges with diverse political leanings. Second, the
criticisms extend beyond the particular decisions under review to
broad-based, systemic complaints about patterns of sloppy, poorly
reasoned decisions that the courts of appeals encounter day after day.
These cases are likely only the tip of the iceberg, because they
include only those that reach the courts of appeals. The vast majority
45
of removal orders never get to that point, sometimes because the
individual has no convincing ground for appeal, but on other
41. Roger C. Cramton, Administrative Procedure Reform: The Effects of S. 1663 on the
Conduct of Federal Rate Proceedings, 16 ADMIN. L. REV. 108, 111–12 (1964).
42. David P. Currie & Frank I. Goodman, Judicial Review of Federal Administrative
Action: Quest for the Optimum Forum, 75 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 4 (1975).
43. Legomsky, supra note 6, at 1313–14.
44. See infra note 68.
45. See EOIR, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, FACT SHEET: BIA RESTRUCTURING AND
STREAMLINING PROCEDURES 2 (2006), available at http://www.justice.gov/eoir/press/06/BIA
StreamliningFactSheet030906.pdf (noting that approximately 30 percent of the BIA’s final
orders are appealed to federal court).
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occasions because the statute bars judicial review, the person lacks
the resources to go to court, or the person has no access to counsel
and never discovers the right to appeal. In all those instances, any
errors that the courts might have corrected in appealed cases go
unnoticed.
Efficiency comprises both using fiscal resources wisely and
minimizing elapsed time. As for the efficient use of resources, the
picture is mixed. On the one hand, the tight budgetary constraints on
EOIR have forced both immigration judges and the BIA to decide
46
massive numbers of cases. Moreover, the procedural shortcuts that
these caseloads prompt adjudicators to adopt have enabled them to
decide cases very quickly. In those senses, efficiency might be
perceived as high.
On the other hand, BIA reforms instituted in 2002 have triggered
a flood of petitions for review in the courts of appeals. As a result, the
courts have had to duplicate much of the BIA’s appellate review—a
highly inefficient result. In fiscal year 2008, the BIA handed down
47
34,812 appeals from decisions of immigration judges. In that same
year, the courts of appeals received 10,280 petitions for review of BIA
48
49
decisions —an approximate appeal rate of 30 percent. Those
petitions for review comprised 17 percent of the combined caseloads
50
of the courts of appeals and have created a now well-documented
51
crisis for the federal courts. The problem is not merely the
46. The data are summarized in Part II.B.1, infra.
47. EOIR, supra note 5, at S2 fig.27.
48. ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, JUDICIAL BUSINESS OF THE UNITED STATES
COURTS: 2008 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR app. at 96 tbl.B-3 (2009), available at http://
www.uscourts.gov/judbus2008/appendices/B03Sep08.pdf.
49. The 30 percent figure is simply 10,280 divided by 34,812. The 10,280 court of appeals
filings in fiscal year 2008 presumably include petitions for review of some 2007 BIA decisions,
and conversely exclude 2009 petitions for review of 2008 BIA decisions. Thus, the two sets of
cases are not 100 percent congruent, and the 30 percent figure is therefore only an estimate. It is
most likely a very close estimate, however, because the petition for review must be filed within
30 days of the BIA decision. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(1) (2006).
50. In fiscal year 2008 the courts of appeals received 61,104 appeals. ADMIN. OFFICE OF
THE U.S. COURTS, supra note 48, app. at 96 tbl.B-3.
51. See DORSEY & WHITNEY LLP, supra note 7, at 12–13; Alexander, supra note 7, at 2;
Benson, supra note 7, at 410–15; Cathy Catterson, Changes in Appellate Caseload and Its
Processing, 48 ARIZ. L. REV. 287, 287–88 (2006); John R.B. Palmer, The Nature and Causes of
the Immigration Surge in the Federal Courts of Appeals: A Preliminary Analysis, 51 N.Y.L. SCH.
L. REV. 13, 14, 20 (2006/07); John R.B. Palmer, Stephen W. Yale-Loehr & Elizabeth Cronin,
Why Are So Many People Challenging Board of Immigration Appeals Decisions in Federal
Court? An Empirical Analysis of the Recent Surge in Petitions for Review, 20 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J.
1, 3 (2005). The Circuit Executive of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit described
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overtaxing of the judges; caseload pressures have required massive
increases in the legal staffs, the clerks’ offices, and the circuit
52
53
executives’ offices, as well as government prosecutorial resources.
The Second and Ninth Circuits have been hit the hardest. In fiscal
year 2008, immigration cases comprised 41 percent of the entire
54
Second Circuit docket and 34 percent of the Ninth Circuit docket.
To cope with its bloated docket, the Second Circuit has had to
55
institute a no-oral-argument system for asylum cases.
Adding to the inefficiency are the high remand rates reported by
at least two circuits. The Second Circuit has been remanding
approximately 20 percent of its petitions for review of BIA decisions,
56
and the Seventh Circuit 40 percent. (The national remand rate is
57
murkier but almost certainly lower, a point taken up below.) When
the remand rates are that high, the inefficiency of a second round of
appellate review is compounded by the need for the BIA to review
cases a second time (and for the courts of appeals to review cases a
second time when the immigrants petition for review of the second
BIA decision).
Perhaps most important, “efficient” does not mean “cheap.” The
ideal adjudication system would churn out a high number of accurate
decisions at a low cost. In algebraic terms, adjudicatory efficiency
might therefore be thought of as productivity times accuracy, divided
58
by cost.
the court’s caseload problem succinctly: “two words: ‘immigration cases.’” Catterson, supra, at
294.
52. Catterson, supra note 51, at 293 tbl.4.
53. See infra notes 271–75 and accompanying text.
54. In that year, 2,865 of the 6,904 cases filed in the Second Circuit were petitions for
review of BIA decisions, as were 4,625 of the 13,577 cases filed in the Ninth Circuit. ADMIN.
OFFICE OF U.S. COURTS, supra note 48, app. at 97 tbl.B-3, 100 tbl.B-3.
55. See Immigration Litigation Reduction: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary,
109th Cong. 5, 7 (2006) (testimony of John M. Walker, Jr., C.J., U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit), available at http://www.access.gpo.gov/congress/senate/pdf/109hrg/28339.pdf
(discussing the Second Circuit’s “Non-Argument Calendar”).
56. Id. at 188 (statement of John M. Walker, Jr.); see also Benslimane v. Gonzales, 430 F.3d
828, 829 (7th Cir. 2005) (“In the year ending on the date of the argument, different panels of this
court reversed the Board of Immigration Appeals in whole or part in a staggering 40 percent of
the 136 petitions to review the Board that were resolved on the merits.”).
57. See infra notes 112–15 and accompanying text.
58. This formula is meant only to capture what I see as the basic relationship among
accuracy, productivity, cost, and efficiency. It is subject to important caveats. Accuracy, as just
noted, is difficult to measure because the subjective nature of many decisions often leaves
adjudicators with more than one “correct” answer. Also, even if every decision could be labeled
definitively as right or wrong, my formula is agnostic with respect to the values to be placed on
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Finally, efficiency also embraces elapsed time. As of April 30,
2009, there were 201,000 cases pending before the immigration
59
judges, a 19 percent increase in three years. The average age of the
pending cases, again as of the end of fiscal year 2008, was 14.5
60
months, an increase of 23 percent over the same period. I could not
find analogous data for the BIA or for the courts of appeals, but
whatever the average elapsed times are for these adjudicatory bodies,
having two rounds of appellate review rather than one adds further
delay. Again, when so many cases are remanded to the BIA (and
some of those decisions on remand appealed once again to the courts
of appeals), the delays are exacerbated.
Delay is particularly inefficient in the removal context.
Individuals are routinely detained while they wait, at a great cost to
61
both personal liberty and the public fisc. Those who are not detained
have additional incentives to delay their removals by filing appeals,
and some people believe these incentives have spawned large
62
numbers of frivolous appeals. Moreover, immigrants are subject to
forcible removal from the United States while awaiting the outcomes
of their petitions for review, unless the court affirmatively directs
63
otherwise.

accuracy and productivity. If accuracy were quantified as the ratio of correct decisions to total
decisions, for example, this formula would produce some counterinstinctive results. A system
that decides one hundred cases but gets only half of them right would earn the same efficiency
rating as a system that, at the same cost, decides only fifty cases but gets all of them right. Yet
most would regard the latter system as far more efficient. As that result suggests, the relative
values that one assigns to one unit of accuracy and one unit of productivity, respectively, will
influence one’s assessment of efficiency.
59. Transactional Records Access Clearinghouse, Number of Immigration Judges, 1998–
2008 on Payroll at End of Fiscal Year, http://trac.syr.edu/immigration/reports/208/include/
backlog.html (last visited Mar. 28, 2010).
60. Id.
61. See Stephen H. Legomsky, The Detention of Aliens: Theories, Rules, and Discretion, 30
U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 531, 542 (1999); Peter H. Schuck, INS Detention and Removal: A
“White Paper,” 11 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 667, 680 (1997); Margaret H. Taylor, Detained Aliens
Challenging Conditions of Confinement and the Porous Border of the Plenary Power Doctrine,
22 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 1087, 1099–102 (1995). See generally MARK DOW, AMERICAN
GULAG: INSIDE U.S. IMMIGRATION PRISONS (2004) (studying detainee treatment in American
immigration prisons).
62. Judge Carlos Bea of the Ninth Circuit, for example, believes that the flood of petitions
for review in the courts of appeals has caused backlogs that have themselves encouraged many
people to file frivolous petitions for review solely to delay their removal. Family, supra note 32,
at 521.
63. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(3)(B) (2006).
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The acceptability goal reflects the familiar maxim that justice
must not only be done, but be seen. Viewed in that light, acceptability
has two components, one concerning the parties to the case and the
other concerning the general public. An ideal justice system assures
the parties that justice was carried out both substantively and
procedurally. The frustrations of the parties to removal hearings are
reflected in the extremely high rates of appeal from the BIA to the
courts. As noted above, the courts of appeals received petitions for
review in approximately 30 percent of the BIA decisions rendered in
fiscal year 2008. As high as that percentage is, it understates the level
of dissatisfaction with the BIA decisions because, for a number of
reasons, only a fraction of the BIA decisions are appealable. First,
only the immigrant, not the government, may file a petition for
64
review. Second, because the principal question in most removal
proceedings is whether the immigrant should receive some form of
65
discretionary relief, and because Congress has barred the courts of
66
appeals from reviewing most denials of discretionary relief, many
BIA decisions cannot be appealed even when the immigrants are the
aggrieved parties. This combination means that the percentage of
reviewable BIA decisions in which the immigrant seeks review is
much higher than the already substantial 30 percent figure. Finally,
even when the immigrant has lost before the BIA and the decision is
67
reviewable, the immigrant who lacks counsel, the resources to
appeal, or simply knowledge that review is possible might well fail to
file a petition. For all these reasons, the high rate at which immigrants
seek review of BIA decisions should raise a red flag.
If there were reason to assume immigrants file petitions for
review primarily to delay their removals, the high rates of these
petitions would offer little probative evidence of the lack of
confidence in BIA decisions. But because a petition for review no
64. The statute does not say this expressly, but under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(1), judicial review
“is governed only by chapter 158 of title 28.” That title, in turn, contains 28 U.S.C. § 2344, which
prescribes petitions for review in the courts of appeals as the procedure for challenging various
administrative agency decisions and adds “[t]he action shall be against the United States.”
Because the United States presumably cannot bring an action against itself, the latter sentence
implies that only the party aggrieved by government action may petition for review. In practice,
the government has no need to ask a court to reverse a BIA decision because the attorney
general can simply do so unilaterally. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(h) (2009).
65. See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
66. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B).
67. In fiscal year 2008, 78 percent of the immigrants who appealed to the BIA had legal
representation. EOIR, supra note 5, at W1 fig.30.
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longer stays removal (unless the court, after preliminarily reviewing
the merits of the case, orders otherwise), there is little reason to
assume delay is the dominant motive.
The other component of acceptability is public confidence in the
integrity and efficiency of the process. Though there is no evidence
that the general public has any particular view of the immigration
adjudication procedures, scathing criticisms are now commonplace
among experts. The succession of stern rebukes from courts of
appeals—often directed at systemic patterns rather than confined to
68
the cases before them—have been well publicized. Scholarly studies
69
and commentary consistently offer similarly harsh critiques. The
70
2002 BIA reforms have only heightened that dissatisfaction.
Consistency, like the other adjudication goals, is a matter of
degree. Ideally, both a single adjudicator’s internal body of work and
the decisions of the adjudicators collectively should produce similar
results on similar facts. Viewed in that light, consistency is bound up
with the other adjudication goals. Inconsistent results can evidence
inaccurate outcomes, diminish public confidence in the system, and
generate inefficiencies such as additional appeals. Inconsistency is
also independently problematic because it undermines the equal
justice principle that similarly situated parties should receive similar
treatment.
On this score, too, serious problems are evident. At least three
recent major studies have exposed eye-popping differences in the
71
approval rates from one asylum adjudicator to another. One set of

68. For lists of court decisions containing some of the more pointed language (as well as
court decisions that in turn cite lists of similar court decisions), see STEPHEN H. LEGOMSKY &
CRISTINA M. RODRÍGUEZ, IMMIGRATION AND REFUGEE LAW AND POLICY 747–48 (5th ed.
2009); Benedetto, supra note 7, at 492–93.
69. See, e.g., Alexander, supra note 7, at 21, 25. In addition to direct criticisms of the
process, see supra note 7, the ABA Commission report notes “public skepticism” about the
immigration court process and, given the attorney general’s control over the procedures,
perceptions that the system as a whole is unfair. COMM’N ON IMMIGRATION, supra note 7, at 28,
44.
70. See supra note 7.
71. See TRANSACTIONAL RECORDS ACCESS CLEARINGHOUSE, ASYLUM DISPARITIES
PERSIST, REGARDLESS OF COURT LOCATION AND NATIONALITY (2007), http://trac.syr.edu/
immigration/reports/183/; U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, NO. GAO-08-940, U.S.
ASYLUM SYSTEM: SIGNIFICANT VARIATION EXISTED IN ASYLUM OUTCOMES ACROSS
IMMIGRATION COURTS AND JUDGES (2008), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d08940.
pdf; see also Ramji-Nogales et al., supra note 7, at 296 (“[I]n one regional asylum office . . . some
officers grant[ed] asylum to no Chinese nationals, while other officers granted asylum in as
many as 68% of their cases. Similarly, Colombian asylum applicants whose cases were
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adjudicators, the asylum officers employed by USCIS, are beyond the
scope of this Article. Among the immigration judges, however, the
authors observed the same spectacular disparities, even after
controlling for different office locations and for the claimants’ varying
countries of origin. All three studies were confined to asylum cases,
which possess distinctive attributes, but there is no apparent
distinction between asylum cases and nonasylum removal cases that
would systematically generate any greater consistency within the
latter group.
B. The Causes
Measured by accuracy, efficiency, acceptability, and consistency,
therefore, the current immigration adjudication system is
fundamentally flawed. The next challenge is to locate the sources of
these problems. The four prime suspects are (1) the extreme
underresourcing of EOIR, with exceptionally high ratios of caseloads
to adjudicators, support staff, and prosecutors; (2) procedural
shortcuts such as making single-member decisions the norm and
resorting heavily to either affirmances without opinion or other
cursory opinions; (3) politicization of EOIR through a combination of
partisan and ideological hiring practices (now largely corrected),
continuing threats to adjudicators’ job security, subjection of
adjudicators’ decisions to a political official with law enforcement
responsibilities, and the general supervision of adjudicators and
control of their resources by enforcement officials; and (4) a small but
significant number of adjudicators who are not well suited to the job.
One complication is that some of these causes are in turn the results
of other causes.
1. Suspect # 1: The Underresourcing of EOIR. Massive caseloads
have strained the capacities of adjudicators, their support staffs, and
government prosecutors. In fiscal year 2008, immigration judges
completed 278,939 removal proceedings, another 2,102 miscellaneous
proceedings, 13,294 motions to reopen and other motions, and 44,736
72
bond redetermination hearings. Approximately 214 immigration
adjudicated in the federal immigration court in Miami had a 5% chance of prevailing with one
of that court’s judges and an 88% chance of prevailing before another judge in the same
building.”).
72. EOIR, supra note 5, at C4 tbl.4, B7 fig.3. The figure shown above for removal
proceedings includes small numbers of exclusion and deportation proceedings—the now
superseded names for what are today called removal proceedings. Id. at C4 tbl.4.
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73

judges performed this work. Taking a range of factors into account,
one study estimated that over the course of fiscal year 2008, the
average immigration judge completed 4.3 removal cases each day. On
that assumption, the same study calculated that reducing each
immigration judge’s caseload by just one case per day would require
seventy-six additional immigration judges; to reduce the load by two
74
cases per day would require 204 new immigration judges. Another
study estimated that the average immigration judge had available
only seventy-three minutes per matter (not just removal proceedings)
75
received.
Those caseloads would strain the capacities of adjudicators under
almost any circumstances, but the news gets worse. The support staffs
of the immigration judges are exceptionally thin, a longstanding
76
problem that has worsened with today’s much larger caseloads. As
of August 20, 2009, the 232 immigration judges shared only fifty-six
77
78
law clerks —approximately one for every four immigration judges.
There are no bailiffs; immigration judges must therefore take time for
administrative chores such as arranging the recording of the hearings

73. Transactional Records Access Clearinghouse, Number of Immigration Judges, 1998–
2009, http://trac.syr.edu/immigration/reports/208/include/payroll.html (last visited Mar. 30,
2010). The TRAC figure counts only those immigration judges who decide cases, not others who
hold the title “immigration judge” but perform purely administrative functions. See id. As of
August 20, 2009, there were 232 immigration judges (including those in administrative
positions), plus twenty-one vacancies and a fiscal year 2010 budget request for twenty-eight new
immigration judge positions. Elaine Komis, Pub. Affairs Officer, EOIR, EOIR’s Immigration
Court and Board of Immigration Appeals: Staffing, Budget, and Case Adjudications 1 (Sept. 9,
2009) (on file with the Duke Law Journal).
74. APPLESEED, supra note 7, at 10. Others have estimated the average caseload at four
per day, COMM’N ON IMMIGRATION, supra note 7, at 28, five per day, Immigration Litigation
Reduction, supra note 55, at 6, and even six per day, Alexander, supra note 7, at 19.
75. Transactional Records Access Clearinghouse, Maximum Average Minutes Available
Per Matter Received, http://trac.syr.edu/immigration/reports/208/include/minutes.html (last
visited Mar. 30, 2010).
76. See Roberts, supra note 7, at 16 (arguing that “[i]n considering any alternatives to the
present system,” “[a]dequate support” is necessary); Leon Wildes, The Need for a Specialized
Immigration Court: A Practical Response, 18 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 53, 55, 63 (1980) (reviewing
Roberts’s reform proposal and concurring with the need for increased funding and staffing to
clear “the backlog of unadjudicated applications”).
77. Komis, supra note 73, at 1.
78. See Transactional Records Access Clearinghouse, Number of Judicial Law Clerks,
2006–2009, http://trac.syr.edu/immigration/reports/208/include/lawclerks.html (last visited Mar.
30, 2010). For similar calculations, see APPLESEED, supra note 7, at 11; COMM’N ON
IMMIGRATION, supra note 7, at 28; ABA, Resolution 114B Adopted by the House of Delegates
2 (Feb. 8–9, 2010), available at http://www.abanet.org/leadership/2010/midyear/daily_jourmal/
114B.pdf.
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79

Many immigrants are
and keeping track of documents.
unrepresented in removal hearings, so the immigration judge must
take time to advise the immigrants of possible relief provisions,
80
explain the procedures, and answer questions. Moreover, 78 percent
81
of individuals in removal hearings require language interpreters. In
addition to interpreted testimony inherently consuming twice the
usual time because of the need to repeat it in a second language,
immigration judges must often labor to assure the accuracy of the
82
translations.
For all these reasons, a parade of judges, commentators, and
organizations have lamented the extreme underresourcing of the
83
immigration courts. Chief Judge Walker of the Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit, testifying before the Senate Judiciary Committee,
84
urged a doubling of the immigration judge corps. He added:
I fail to see how Immigration Judges can be expected to make
thorough and competent findings of fact and conclusions of law
under these circumstances. This is especially true given the unique
nature of immigration hearings. Aliens frequently do not speak
English, so the Immigration Judge must work with a translator, and
the Immigration Judge normally must go over particular testimony
several times before he can be confident that he is getting an
accurate answer from the alien. Hearings, particularly in asylum
cases, are highly fact intensive and depend upon the presentation
and consideration of numerous details and documents to determine
issues of credibility and to reach factual conclusions. This can take

79. TRANSACTIONAL RECORDS ACCESS CLEARINGHOUSE, CASE BACKLOGS IN
IMMIGRATION COURTS EXPAND, RESULTING WAIT TIMES GROW (2009), http://trac.syr.edu/
immigration/reports/208/.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Ramji-Nogales et al., supra note 7, at 383.
83. See Immigration Litigation Reduction, supra note 55, at 5–7; APPLESEED, supra note 7,
at 10; Alexander, supra note 7, at 19–20; Benedetto, supra note 7, at 500; Marks, supra note 7, at
8, 13 (calling the case completion expectations unrealistic with present resources); RamjiNogales et al., supra note 7, at 383; TRANSACTIONAL RECORDS ACCESS CLEARINGHOUSE,
supra note 79; cf. COMM’N ON IMMIGRATION, supra note 7, at 19–21 (tracing excessive EOIR
caseloads to insufficient funding, but also faulting DHS reluctance to use prosecutorial
discretion in cases where transgressions were minor or chances of removal were slim).
84. Immigration Litigation Reduction, supra note 55, at 6; see also ABA, supra note 78, at 2
(recommending one hundred additional immigration judges and at least one law clerk per
judge); COMM’N ON IMMIGRATION, supra note 7, at 28 (same).
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no small amount of time depending on the nature of the alien’s
85
testimony.

The situation is no rosier at the BIA. In fiscal year 2008, fifteen
86
BIA members decided more than 38,000 cases —an average of more
than 2,500 appeals per member per year (more than fifty per week).
As with the immigration judges, the overwhelming BIA caseload has
87
come under strong criticism.
The adjudicators, however, are not the only government
personnel who lack the resources to give these cases the attention
they deserve. The government prosecutors are feeling the strain as
well. ICE’s Principal Legal Advisor reports:
Across the country our Assistant Chief Counsels [the ICE attorneys
who represent the government in immigration judge and BIA
proceedings] universally and passionately opine that they do not
have nearly enough time to properly prepare for immigration
proceedings, let alone to advise our clients or to work on appeals
before the BIA. Indeed, the universal feeling is that they are
woefully unprepared for immigration hearings due to the extremely
large amount of individual cases they are required to cover before
88
the immigration judges.

What have been the practical effects of this steadily more
extreme underresourcing? I believe it has generated an intricate
network of adverse causes and consequences that might be
summarized as follows:
First, at least at the immigration judge level, underresourcing has
contributed simultaneously to less judge time per case and longer
elapsed time from filing to disposition (and therefore to steadily
growing backlogs). The data confirm both results. A recent study by

85. Immigration Litigation Reduction, supra note 55, at 186–87.
86. EOIR, supra note 5, at S2 fig.27.
87. See, e.g., Immigration Litigation Reduction, supra note 55, at 6 (urging that the number
of BIA members be doubled); APPLESEED, supra note 7, at 34; Alexander, supra note 7, at 20–
21; Benson, supra note 7, at 418. The ABA has recommended hiring forty additional BIA staff
attorneys. ABA, Resolution 114C Adopted by the House of Delegates 4 (Feb. 8–9, 2010),
available at http://www.abanet.org/leadership/2010/midyear/daily_jourmal/114C.pdf; COMM’N
ON IMMIGRATION, supra note 7, at 34.
88. E-mail from Peter Vincent, supra note 10. The previous principal legal advisor had
echoed similar sentiments, adding that on average the ICE trial attorneys (as they were then
called) had only twenty minutes to prepare each case. APPLESEED, supra note 7, at 16 (citing
ICE Principal Legal Advisor William J. Howard and calling for the hiring of additional trial
attorneys).
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Transactional Records Access Clearinghouse (TRAC) reveals that,
from 1998 to 2008, the number of immigration judges increased by
89
only 6 percent (from 202 to 214), while the total number of matters
90
received increased by 24 percent (from 282,348 to 351,477). At the
same time that this increase in the caseloads was significantly
outpacing the increase in the number of immigration judges, two
other patterns emerged. Naturally, the average time available per
matter received diminished (from an already low eighty-six minutes
91
to seventy-three minutes). Even with immigration judges spending
less time per case, the backlog increased from 129,482 pending cases
92
to 186,342 cases. The average time that cases were pending increased
93
correspondingly, from 10.8 months to 14.5 months. From these data,
it appears that immigration judges responded to the increasingly
severe underresourcing both by reducing time spent per case and by
increasing elapsed time from filings to final dispositions—that is,
longer delays.
In addition to rushed decisions and increased delays,
underresourcing has contributed to the now well-documented
burnout of immigration judges. A recent empirical study has
confirmed the exceptionally high stress and burnout levels of
immigration judges—levels even higher than those experienced by
94
prison wardens and emergency room physicians. The authors
identified several root causes of the burnout, but by far the most
commonly reported problems related to the lack of sufficient time
95
and resources to meet the case completion expectations. More
specifically, the immigration judges complained of too little time per
case; the pressure to provide immediate, detailed, oral decisions, even
in complex cases, with no time to research the law or country
conditions, no time to reflect, and no transcripts; unprepared lawyers
(on both sides); difficulties with interpreters; insufficient staffing,

89. Transactional Records Access Clearinghouse, supra note 73.
90. Transactional Records Access Clearinghouse, supra note 75.
91. Id.
92. Transactional Records Access Clearinghouse, supra note 59.
93. Id.
94. See Stuart L. Lustig et al., Inside the Judges’ Chambers: Narrative Responses from the
National Association of Immigration Judges Stress and Burnout Survey, 23 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J.
57, 59–60 (2008) (summarizing the results of a web-based survey of immigration judges).
95. Id. at 64–70.
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including very few law clerks; faulty and outdated computers and
96
recording devices; and inadequate work space.
Finally, the underresourcing and resulting BIA backlogs drove
97
the Justice Department’s BIA procedural reforms in 2002. The
centerpiece of those reforms was the elimination of various
procedural safeguards. The effects exacerbated some of the problems
associated with the underresourcing, as the next Section explains.
In turn, these consequences of underresourcing—the reduced
time per case, increased backlogs, and immigration judge burnout—
have all had additional adverse effects. As Chief Judge Walker of the
United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit has testified,
“the principal reason . . . for the current backlog in the Courts of
Appeals, and the reason that we have higher expected numbers of
cases being remanded are a severe lack of resources and manpower at
98
the immigration judge and BIA levels in the Department of Justice.”
Chief Judge Walker’s conclusion is not surprising. When adjudicators
are pressured to decide so many cases involving complex facts and
often complex law every day, particularly with the limited resources
just described, the result will inevitably be conveyor-belt justice, no
matter how talented and how diligent the personnel. Immigration
adjudication might not be uniquely underresourced, but in this field
the problem is extreme, and both the individual and the public
interests are large.
The causal links, therefore, are intricate. Rushed decisions
contribute to burnout. Rushed decisions and burnout together
inevitably compromise accuracy and consistency, a harm in and of
itself. Reduced accuracy and consistency in turn lead to more
petitions for review, which then compound the delays that the
underresourcing has already caused at the administrative level. For
those who believe that delays spur frivolous appeals from immigrants
desirous only of prolonging their stays in the United States, the
96. Id. Other sources of the burnout and stress include lack of respect from the courts, the
Department of Justice, and the public; post-traumatic stress from hearing a steady diet of
wrenching asylum cases; and perceptions of fraud in the presentation of cases. Id. at 71–77.
97. See Board of Immigration Appeals: Procedural Reforms to Improve Case
Management, 67 Fed. Reg. 54,878, 54,878–79 (Aug. 26, 2002) (codified as amended at 8 C.F.R.
pt. 1003) (presenting as background the problems in the adjudicatory process of immigration
appeals); John D. Ashcroft & Kris W. Kobach, A More Perfect System: The 2002 Reforms of the
Board of Immigration Appeals, 58 DUKE L.J. 1991, 1991–92, 1994 (2009) (discussing the massive
backlog of immigration cases and its negative effects, as well as the regulatory goal of gradually
eliminating that backlog).
98. Immigration Litigation Reduction, supra note 55, at 5.
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effects are cyclical; the additional appeals cause further backlogs,
which further increase the delays, which further enhance the incentive
to file frivolous appeals, and so on. All of these consequences, in turn,
feed the frustrations of the parties, the courts, and the general public,
impairing the acceptability goal of the adjudication process. And the
diminished acceptability prompts increasingly sharp and increasingly
numerous criticisms that in turn aggravate the adjudicator burnout to
which some of the inaccuracies and inconsistencies can be attributed
in the first place.
But there is more:
2. Suspect # 2: The Procedural Shortcuts at the BIA. Of the
various BIA procedural reforms introduced by Attorney General
Ashcroft in 2002, two have generated the lion’s share of the
controversy. One initiative concerns the so-called “affirmances
without opinion” (AWOs). These are cases in which the BIA is
99
prohibited from giving reasons for its decisions. The 2002 reforms
100
made AWOs the norm rather than the exception. After the
resulting dramatic spike in the percentages of decisions culminating in
AWOs, formal AWOs have now dwindled to approximately 5 percent
101
of the BIA decisions. That decline is of small consolation, however,
because “short opinions by single members are now the dominant
form of decision making. . . . [T]hey can be as short as two or three
sentences, even when the issues would appear to merit a longer
102
discussion.’’ The other controversial structural change was moving
from three-member panel review in the vast majority of cases to
103
single-member review in the vast majority (at this writing, 94
104
percent) of all BIA cases. Both elements have real costs in terms of
99. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(e)(4) (2009). A still-pending proposed rule would make AWOs
discretionary rather than mandatory. See Board of Immigration Appeals: Affirmance Without
Opinion, Referral for Panel Review, and Publication of Decisions as Precedents, 73 Fed. Reg.
34,654, 34,663 (proposed June 18, 2008) (to be codified at 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1).
100. See Board of Immigration Appeals: Procedural Reforms to Improve Case
Management, 67 Fed. Reg. 54,878, 54,880 (Aug. 26, 2002) (codified as amended at 8 C.F.R. pt.
1003) (“The final rule establishes the primacy of the streamlining system for the majority of
cases.”).
101. See infra notes 119–20 and accompanying text.
102. COMM’N ON IMMIGRATION, supra note 7, at 32.
103. See Board of Immigration Appeals: Procedural Reforms to Improve Case
Management, 67 Fed. Reg. at 54,879 (asserting the rule’s expansion of single-member review to
“the dominant method of adjudication for the large majority of cases before the Board”).
104. Komis, supra note 73, app. question 17. From fiscal years 2003 through 2008, this
percentage remained between 93 percent and 94 percent. Id.
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accuracy, acceptability, consistency, and even efficiency, given the
resulting diversion of BIA cases to the courts.
There is ample reason to believe the 2002 BIA procedural
reforms have greatly exacerbated the problems discussed in Section
A. The most compelling evidence of a causal link is the absence of
any other plausible explanation for the coincidence in timing. The
105
reforms officially took effect on September 25, 2002. The avalanche
of petitions for review of BIA decisions began suddenly after that, as
Table 1 demonstrates.
Table 1. Petitions for Review of BIA Decisions Filed During Twelve106
Month Periods Ending March 31
Twelve-Month Periods Ending
March 31 of Year

Petitions for Review of BIA
Orders Commenced

2001

1,763

2002

1,764

2003

8,446

2004

8,720

2005

11,464

2006

13,059

2007

10,042

2008

9,761

2009

8,890

To the extent the surge in petitions for review is both
problematic in and of itself and evidence of deeper problems in the
tribunals whose decisions are being challenged, Table 1 compels at
least a presumption that the 2002 BIA procedural reforms are, and
remain, a principal cause of those problems. The number of petitions

105. Board of Immigration Appeals: Procedural Reforms to Improve Case Management, 67
Fed. Reg. at 54,878 (specifying effective date of Sept. 25, 2002). Some of the reforms, however,
were implemented in stages in the preceding few months. See, e.g., Ramji-Nogales et al., supra
note 7, at 351–52 (describing the March 2002 expansion of affirmances without opinion); cf.
DORSEY & WHITNEY LLP, supra note 7, at 24–25 (discussing the time limits added in the
modified case management procedures).
106. These data are extracted from a chart provided by Cathy Catterson, Circuit Executive,
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit (June 9, 2009) (on file with the Duke Law Journal).
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for review in the years ending March 31, 2001 and 2002 were virtually
identical—1,763 and 1,764, respectively. During the next twelvemonth period, the first year in which the BIA procedural reforms
were in effect, filings almost quintupled. Filings peaked three years
later at 13,059. They have since declined but still remain at more than
five times the pre-BIA reform levels.
Are there alternative explanations for this sudden surge?
Changes in total BIA decisions cannot explain this phenomenon. The
BIA’s output has fluctuated over the years, but in each of the three
most recent years (ending March 31, 2009), total BIA decisions have
been almost exactly the same as in the year ending March 31, 2002,
107
the last year before the BIA reforms went into effect. Most telling
have been the dramatic changes in the rates at which immigrants have
petitioned for review of BIA decisions. In the twelve-month period
ending March 31, 2002 (the last twelve-month period before the
reforms), immigrants petitioned for review of only 5 percent of all
BIA decisions. That rate more than tripled—to 16 percent—the very
next year and continued to rise steadily after that, peaking at 32
108
percent in the year ending March 31, 2006.
The number of BIA decisions adverse to immigrants is a truer
measure of rates of petitions for review than total BIA decisions,
because only immigrants—not the government—may file petitions for
109
review. Indeed, several studies show that the BIA procedural
reforms led immediately to a significant drop in the percentage of
110
BIA decisions favorable to immigrants. Still, although the estimates
of the changes in BIA outcomes vary, none of them approaches the
111
order of magnitude of the percentage surge in petitions for review.
Moreover, to the extent that the increase in progovernment BIA
decisions contributed to the surge in petitions for review, the question

107. Id.
108. Id.
109. See supra note 64 and accompanying text.
110. See DORSEY & WHITNEY LLP, supra note 7, app. 24; Alexander, supra note 7, at 12;
Palmer et al., supra note 51, at 94; Ramji-Nogales et al., supra note 7, at 358–59.
111. By way of illustration, one estimate is that the percentage of BIA decisions in favor of
immigrants suddenly dropped from 25 percent to 10 percent following the procedural reforms.
Alexander, supra note 7, at 12. If those figures are correct, then the percentage of BIA decisions
in favor of the government increased from 75 percent to 90 percent. Even that substantial
difference, however, would increase the pool of judicially reviewable cases by only 15 of 75, or
20 percent (all else equal)—not nearly enough to explain the quintupling in petitions for review.
See Ramji-Nogales et al., supra note 7, at 360–61 (documenting similarly sharp drops in BIA
asylum approval rates).
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arises: What caused the increase in progovernment BIA decisions?
Because that large and sudden change coincided with the BIA
procedural reforms (as well as the personnel purge discussed in
Section II.B.3), the latter would seem, in the absence of other
explanations, to be the most compelling explanation. The conclusion
seems irrefutable: the more time and attention the BIA was able to
give to a case, whether by assigning the case to a three-member panel,
providing a reasoned opinion, or both, the more likely the immigrant
was to prevail. The moment these procedural safeguards were
eliminated, immigrants began losing at greater rates. The correlation
is troubling.
The Justice Department does not dispute the link between the
2002 BIA procedural reforms and the surge in petitions for review.
Rather, it maintains that the surge simply does not evidence any
112
decrease in the accuracy of the BIA decisions. It argues that a truer
test of the quality of the BIA decisions is the rate at which the courts
of appeals have remanded decisions once petitions for review are
filed, and it asserts that those remand rates have not changed
significantly since the implementation of the 2002 BIA procedural
113
reforms. For the latter proposition, the Department refers vaguely
to “feedback” from federal courts and the Department’s Office of
Immigration Litigation (OIL), the unit that argues the government’s
side in petitions for review. The Department did not provide citations
or specific numbers to support this claim. In fact, the data on the rates
at which the courts of appeals have remanded BIA decisions (and on
114
the changes in those rates) are murky. As noted in Section A, the
remand rates are exceptionally high in the Second and Seventh
115
Circuits, but estimates of the national rates are mixed.
Moreover, if anything, one would expect a constant accuracy
level at the BIA to result in decreasing remand rates by the courts of
appeals, for three reasons. First, the relevant period (2002 through
early 2009) was one in which all federal judicial appointments were
those of President George W. Bush. A more conservative judiciary
would have been expected to display greater deference to the BIA
and less sympathy for the immigrants who were filing petitions for

112. See EOIR, supra note 45, at 2.
113. See id.
114. See supra notes 56–57 and accompanying text.
115. See, e.g., APPLESEED, supra note 7, at 32; COMM’N ON IMMIGRATION, supra note 7, at
33; Alexander, supra note 7, at 14; Ashcroft & Kobach, supra note 97, at 2009.
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review. Second, the Justice Department believes that the new flood of
petitions for review are largely frivolous, motivated principally by a
desire to delay removal. If the Department is right, however, one
would expect a sharp drop in the success rate for these new petitions
for review—not merely the absence of significant change. Third, as
the courts of appeals remand more and more cases with explanations
and instructions, the BIA acquires more information and should be
better able to identify patterns that permit it to head off potential
court of appeals remands.
If not a drop in accuracy of BIA decisions (or at least a lessened
confidence in those decisions), then what might explain the surge
occurring immediately following the implementation of the 2002 BIA
procedural reforms? The Justice Department offered the following
theories:
[I]t is reasonable to conclude that the initial increase may have been
largely attributable to challenges to the new regulation. However,
new petitions for review have continued to increase despite the
federal courts’ uniform rejection of these challenges. It is possible
that eliminating BIA adjudication delays has increased the incentive
to file petitions for review in the federal courts in order to postpone
deportation and remain in the United States for as long as
116
possible.

The Department thus acknowledges that the initial challenges to
the validity of the 2002 BIA reforms do not explain the continuation
of the surge long after those challenges had been uniformly rejected.
At any rate, the Department makes no showing that petitions raising
those challenges (and only those challenges) comprised a significant
percentage of those early petitions for review. Its only remaining
hypothesis, therefore, is that the reforms shortened the elapsed time
for BIA appeals and that, as a result, those immigrants who are
motivated solely by a desire to delay their ultimate deportations must
now resort to filing frivolous petitions for review. This hypothesis,
too, seems implausible. First, stays pending judicial review are no
longer automatic; petitioners for review must persuade the reviewing
117
courts that their petitions have enough merit to justify stays. Second
and more importantly, the essential premise of the Department’s
116. EOIR, supra note 45, at 3.
117. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(3)(B) (2006); see also Nken v. Holder, 129 S. Ct. 1749, 1763 (2009)
(prescribing a multifactor test, which includes the likelihood of success on the merits, for
determining whether to stay removal pending final court decision).
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speculation is that attaining one period of delay diminishes one’s
incentive for further delay. There is no basis for that assumption. To
the contrary, if anything, one would expect the person who has
already spent a lengthy period in the United States (as was true when
BIA appeals were taking longer) to have deeper roots and
consequently a greater incentive, not a lesser one, to seek additional
delay.
Moreover, there were logical reasons to expect the procedural
shortcuts implemented in 2002 to have precisely the adverse effects
that occurred. The AWOs are particularly suspect. In any case in
which a single BIA member determines that the immigration judge
reached the correct result, that any errors were harmless, and that the
issues are either “squarely controlled” by precedent or otherwise too
insubstantial to warrant a written opinion, the BIA member is
118
prohibited from giving reasons for his or her decision. In fiscal year
2002 (the year in which the BIA procedural reforms were
announced), 31 percent of all BIA decisions were AWOs, in contrast
119
to 6 percent the previous year. The corresponding percentages for
the next two years were 36 percent and 32 percent, respectively, but
they have since come down drastically, to 5 percent of all BIA
120
decisions in fiscal year 2009.
Because writing a persuasive opinion takes time, BIA members
with staggering caseload pressures and far too little time per case
have a strong incentive to affirm rather than reverse. Consequently,
and not surprisingly, the percentage of cases in which the BIA
reversed immigration judge decisions dropped precipitously after the
121
2002 reforms.
The attorney general’s recent introduction of
performance evaluations for both immigration judges and BIA
122
123
members expands that incentive by emphasizing productivity.

118. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(e)(4) (2009). A still-pending proposed rule would make AWOs
discretionary. See Board of Immigration Appeals: Affirmance Without Opinion, Referral for
Panel Review, and Publication of Decisions as Precedents, 73 Fed. Reg. 34,654, 34,663
(proposed June 18, 2008) (to be codified at 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1); cf. ABA, supra note 87, at 8–9
(also recommending that the BIA be required to respond to all nonfrivolous arguments);
COMM’N ON IMMIGRATION, supra note 7, at 32 (same).
119. Komis, supra note 73, app. question 18.
120. Id.
121. See DORSEY & WHITNEY LLP, supra note 7, app. 24; Alexander, supra note 7, at 12;
Palmer et al., supra note 51, app. at 96 tbl.17; Ramji-Nogales et al., supra note 7, at 358–59.
122. See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Attorney General Alberto R. Gonzales
Outlines Reforms for Immigration Courts and Board of Immigration Appeals (Aug. 9, 2006),
available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2006/August/06_ag_520.html.
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Because immigrants file the overwhelming majority of the appeals to
124
the BIA, the incentive to affirm is ordinarily an incentive to rule in
favor of the government.
A reasoned opinion is valuable for other reasons as well. It
requires the adjudicator to consider the arguments of the losing side
with care. When reasoned opinions can be omitted, affirmance
without due care becomes easier. In addition, the very process of
writing an opinion forces adjudicators to confirm that their tentative
conclusions are the ones most compatible with the evidence and the
law.
Once an adjudicator renders a decision without explanation, the
appellant also has no way to understand the rationale, less confidence
that the decision was correct, and thus a greater incentive to seek
judicial review. The reviewing court, for its part, then has to proceed
without the starting point of a lower tribunal’s opinion and thus will
have to spend time doing the BIA’s job. The court will also
necessarily have less confidence in the BIA decision and more reason
to reverse and remand to the BIA for further consideration or
explanation. The cursory nature of the BIA review would be
detrimental under any circumstances, but it takes on additional
significance in a world in which the immigration judge decisions
under review were themselves rendered under extreme time pressure
and resource shortages. Moreover, reasoned BIA opinions not only

123. Copies of the separate performance evaluation forms for immigration judges and BIA
members were supplied by Elaine Komis, Public Affairs Officer at EOIR, to the author on
September 9, 2009. The immigration judge form includes ratings for “legal ability,”
“professionalism,” and “accountability for organizational results.” EOIR, U.S. Dep’t of Justice,
Performance Appraisal Record: Adjudicative Employees 1 (n.d.) (on file with the Duke Law
Journal). That last category then breaks down into several more specific criteria, of which
criteria 2 and 3 focus expressly, and criterion 1 implicitly, on productivity. See id. at 3–5. The
form for BIA members rates “organizational results,” “critical thinking and technical
proficiency,” and “communication and teamwork.” U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Senior Level &
Scientific Professional Performance Plan and Appraisal 1 (July 1, 2009) (on file with the Duke
Law Journal). Of these, “organizational results” count for 60 percent of the total score, and all
of the specific criteria for evaluating “organizational results” relate to productivity. See id. at 2.
The third category, “communication and teamwork,” counts for an additional 20 percent and
contains only one criterion—“takes the initiative to assist . . . in meeting productivity
expectations.” Id. at 4. The second criterion is the only one that seeks to measure the quality of
adjudication, and it counts for only 20 percent of the final score. See id. at 3. Productivity,
therefore, is the dominant theme.
124. The percentage of BIA decisions in which the immigrants had filed the appeals ranged
from 85 percent to 93 percent during fiscal years 2001 through 2008, inclusive; the other 7
percent to 15 percent were appeals that the government had filed. Komis, supra note 73, app.
question 24.
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provide guidance to the appellants whose cases they are deciding, but
also (at least in cases designated as precedents) bind immigration
125
Without adequate guidance, DHS
judges and DHS officials.
officials and immigration judges have to speculate about the BIA’s
likely future interpretations. Speculation can only increase the
number of reversals and remands, and spawn inconsistent treatment
of similar cases. In addition, without reasoned opinions, it becomes
easy for appellate adjudicators to base their decisions, consciously or
unconsciously, on visceral reactions that reflect their own political
outlooks, thus further eroding both accuracy and consistency.
Single-member decisions are similarly suspect, for they, too,
should be expected to engender the very problems discussed here.
They will generally decrease the attention a case will receive, thereby
increasing the error rate, and thus increasing the rate of further
petitions to the courts of appeals. A panel of three members is less
likely to miss obvious errors. Multimember panels also reduce the
probability that a single individual with a strong ideology (in either
direction) will reach an extreme result that the BIA as a whole would
not have countenanced. They do this by diffusing subjective biases,
permitting deliberation, and promoting consensus. In the process,
multimember panel decisions minimize inconsistency in several
126
ways, a crucial consideration in light of the drastic levels of
127
inconsistency that have plagued immigration adjudicators.
Moreover, multimember panels permit dissenting opinions that can
help steer future law. The exchange of ideas and the airing of
differences of opinion have particular value in an arena in which so
128
many cases are argued pro se and without legal briefs. For all these
reasons, scholarly consensus has been that the 2002 BIA procedural

125. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(g) (2009).
126. See Stephen H. Legomsky, Learning to Live with Unequal Justice: Asylum and the
Limits to Consistency, 60 STAN. L. REV. 413, 431–32, 447–49 (2007).
127. For criticisms of the inconsistency in immigration adjudications, see supra note 71 and
accompanying text.
128. At the BIA level, the percentage of decisions in which the immigrants were
represented by counsel ranged from 69 percent to 78 percent during fiscal years 2004 through
2008, inclusive. EOIR, supra note 5, at W1 fig.30; see also ABA, Resolution 114E Withdrawn by
the House of Delegates (Feb. 8–9, 2010), available at http://www.abanow.org/wordpress/wpcontent/themes/ABANow/wp-content/uploads/resolution-pdfs/MY2010/114E.pdf
(recommending various ways of enhancing access to counsel in removal cases); COMM’N ON
IMMIGRATION, supra note 7, at 32 (same). The advantages of three-member panels have led the
ABA to recommend requiring them in all nonfrivolous BIA appeals. See ABA, supra note 87,
at 5–6; COMM’N ON IMMIGRATION, supra note 7, at 32.
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reforms were chiefly responsible for the sudden surge in petitions for
129
review.
3. Suspect # 3: The Politicization of EOIR. In addition to the
underresourcing and the increased resort to procedural shortcuts,
politicization has impaired the EOIR adjudicatory process.
Components of this politicization include the hiring process,
impediments to decisional independence, and a more general
supervision and control of adjudicators by law enforcement officials.
a. Hiring. Immigration judges and members of the BIA are
130
appointed by the attorney general. All of those adjudicators are
“Schedule A” (career) appointees, as distinguished from “Schedule
131
C” (political) appointees. For career employees, both federal law
and Justice Department policies prohibit hiring discrimination on the
132
Until the spring of 2004, that
basis of political affiliation.
nondiscrimination policy was honored; EOIR’s merit-based
recommendations generally played the principal role in selecting
133
immigration judges.
In response to allegations that the Bush administration had
forced several U.S. attorneys to resign for improper political reasons,
the Justice Department’s Office of Professional Responsibility and its
Office of the Inspector General began a joint internal investigation
into whether the Department had illegally based its hiring of career
employees on candidates’ political affiliations or ideologies.
Testifying under a grant of immunity before the U.S. House Judiciary
Committee, the Department’s former liaison to the White House,
134
Monica Goodling, confirmed the allegations.
Based on her
testimony and abundant additional evidence, the investigation
revealed that, from 2004 to 2006, high officials from the White House

129. For a list of examples, see Alexander, supra note 7, at 11 n.62. A rare contrary view was
expressed by former Attorney General Ashcroft, who ordered the 2002 BIA procedural
reforms, and his chief immigration advisor at the time. See Ashcroft & Kobach, supra note 97.
130. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(b)(4) (2006) (immigration judges); 8 C.F.R. § 1001.1(l) (immigration
judges); id. § 1003.1(a)(1) (BIA members).
131. OFFICE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY & OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP’T OF
JUSTICE, AN INVESTIGATION OF ALLEGATIONS OF POLITICIZED HIRING BY MONICA
GOODLING AND OTHER STAFF IN THE OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL 70–71 (2008),
available at http://www.usdoj.gov/oig/special/s0807/final.pdf.
132. Id. at 12–15.
133. Id. at 72.
134. Id. at 1–2.

LEGOMSKY IN FINAL.DOC

1666

4/28/2010 5:15:26 PM

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 59:1635

and the Department of Justice had bypassed the usual application
procedures to appoint immigration judges based on their Republican
135
Party affiliations or their conservative political views. In all but four
cases, the hiring was accomplished without public competition, and
136
more than half the appointees had no prior immigration experience.
In 2007, the attorney general instituted a new immigration judge
appointment process in which EOIR would once again play the
137
dominant role. Though the hope was that the new process would
eliminate improper political interference, at least one appointment
made by the Bush administration after the change in procedures
138
likely rested primarily on political affiliation. At any rate, many of
the illegally appointed immigration judges remain on the bench
139
today.
Apart from the illegal behavior that dominated the process from
2004 to 2006, hiring procedures continue to favor the appointment of
immigration judges and BIA members whose work experiences
incline them to prioritize immigration enforcement. As other
commentators have shown, former ICE trial attorneys and their
predecessors from the now defunct Immigration and Naturalization
Service (INS), as well as other attorneys working for immigration
enforcement agencies, are heavily represented among immigration
140
judges and the BIA. These demographics are important because
adjudicators with prior immigration enforcement experience are
significantly more prone to rule in favor of the government than those
without such experience—more so, in fact, the longer the duration of
141
their prior INS or DHS employment.
I do not suggest it would be possible, or even desirable, to avoid
appointing adjudicators with preexisting views on immigration issues.
If prior immigration experience is valued, as it should be, preexisting
views will be inevitable. Even those who are appointed without prior
135. Id. at 69–124.
136. Benedetto, supra note 7, at 474. For additional commentary on the hiring improprieties
and the accompanying changes in the appointment process, see APPLESEED, supra note 7, at 7–
9; Marks, supra note 7, at 9; Emma Schwartz & Jason McLure, DOJ Made Immigration
Judgeships Political, LEGAL TIMES, May 28, 2007, at 12.
137. See OFFICE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY & OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., supra
note 131, at 114–15.
138. APPLESEED, supra note 7, at 8–9.
139. Id. at 7.
140. For further empirical evidence on this subject, see Ramji-Nogales et al., supra note 7, at
344–45.
141. Id. at 345–47.
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immigration experience will surely have some preliminary thoughts—
perhaps even well informed and strongly held—on the subject. In any
case, those views will develop soon enough. Consequently, every
adjudicator will bring some measure of ideology to the position
sooner or later. The key is to avoid affirmatively systematizing
proenforcement biases. As others have recommended, recruiting
should be broadened to ensure that candidates from career
142
enforcement positions are not overrepresented.
b. Threats to Decisional Independence. Targeted efforts by
attorneys general or their delegates to influence specific immigration
judge or BIA decisions are rare but not unknown. The most famous
case was that of Joseph Accardi, an alleged mobster whose name had
appeared on the attorney general’s list of “unsavory characters”
143
whom he wished to deport. Shortly after the attorney general
circulated the list, the BIA affirmed a denial of discretionary relief to
144
Accardi. Holding that the attorney general’s regulations required
the BIA to exercise independent judgment, the Supreme Court
ordered the BIA to decide the case anew without considering the
145
attorney general’s list. On remand, the BIA reached the same
conclusion, which the Supreme Court accepted as free of undue
146
influence.
Concerns about the unhealthy marriage of law enforcement and
adjudicatory responsibilities persisted, however, especially given that
147
the immigration judges were part of, and answerable to, the INS. In
1983, therefore, the Justice Department took a major step to separate
the two functions. It created EOIR, an umbrella agency that houses
148
both the immigration judges and the BIA. The move insulated the
immigration judges from the INS, but both immigration judges and
the BIA remain accountable to the attorney general.

142. See APPLESEED, supra note 7, at 9.
143. United States ex rel. Shaughnessy v. Accardi, 347 U.S. 260, 264 (1954).
144. Id. at 263.
145. Id. at 268.
146. Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Accardi, 349 U.S. 280, 282–83 (1955).
147. For an excellent history, see Sidney B. Rawitz, From Wong Yang Sung to Black Robes,
65 INTERPRETER RELEASES 453 (1988).
148. Board of Immigration Appeals: Immigration Review Function; Editorial Amendments,
48 Fed. Reg. 8038, 8039 (Feb. 25, 1983) (codified as amended at 8 C.F.R. § 1003.0(a)). Since
then, a third unit, the Office of the Chief Administrative Hearing Officer (OCAHO), has been
added. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.0(a) (2009).
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Today, as was true after Accardi, regulations require both
immigration judges and the BIA to exercise their discretion
149
independently. Nonetheless, concerns occasionally arise. In 2001, an
INS prosecutor who was dissatisfied with the ruling of an immigration
judge in a removal case telephoned the chief immigration judge, ex
parte, to complain. Rather than instruct the INS prosecutor that the
150
proper remedy would be to appeal to the BIA,
the chief
immigration judge (an administrator who reports to the director of
151
EOIR) directed the immigration judge to change his ruling. The
immigration judge recused himself in protest over the chief
152
immigration judge’s intervention.
These are isolated incidents. More worrisome have been the
erosion of the immigration judges’ and BIA members’ job security
and the real and perceived effects of that erosion on their decisional
independence. Concerns about independence had long lingered in the
background, but they emerged front and center in 2002. In February
of that year (despite simultaneously introducing procedural shortcuts
for the stated purpose of attacking the BIA backlog), Attorney
General Ashcroft announced plans to reduce the number of BIA
153
members from twenty-three to eleven. The final regulations,
published approximately six months later, provided no details as to
154
the criteria he would use in deciding which Board members to cull.
Finally, about one year after the original announcement, Ashcroft

149. 8 C.F.R. §§ 1003.1(d)(2), 1003.10(b) (requiring the BIA and immigration judges,
respectively, to exercise “independent judgment and discretion,” subject to the orders of the
attorney general); see also STEPHEN H. LEGOMSKY, IMMIGRATION AND THE JUDICIARY: LAW
AND POLITICS IN BRITAIN AND AMERICA 287 n.97 (1987) (citing federal appellate decisions
that require the BIA to independently exercise its powers).
150. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(b)(3) (allowing appeals to the BIA from decisions of immigration
judges in removal proceedings).
151. Id. § 1003.9.
152. See LEGOMSKY & RODRÍGUEZ, supra note 68, at 665–68 (giving the details of the
case).
153. Board of Immigration Appeals: Procedural Reforms to Improve Case Management, 67
Fed. Reg. 7309, 7310 (proposed Feb. 19, 2002) (to be codified at 8 C.F.R. pt. 1003).
154. The attorney general referred generally to “traditional” factors, “discretion,” and
qualities such as “integrity . . . , professional competence, and adjudicatorial temperament.”
Board of Immigration Appeals: Procedural Reforms to Improve Case Management, 67 Fed.
Reg. 54,878, 54,893 (Aug. 26, 2002) (codified as amended at 8 C.F.R. pt. 1003). Seniority might
be an “experience indicator” but not “a presumptive factor.” It would not be possible, the
attorney general said, “to establish guidelines or specific factors that will be considered.” Id.
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155

announced the names. A subsequent empirical study by former
congressional counsel Peter Levinson demonstrated that the attorney
general had “reassigned” (to either lower-level immigration judge
positions or nonadjudicative positions on the EOIR staff) those
Board members with the highest percentages of rulings in favor of
156
The study showed that the selections bore no
noncitizens.
resemblance to the general criteria to which the final rule had
157
referred—integrity, professional competence, and temperament. In
158
total, five members were excised. They included the former chair of
the Board, two former full-time immigration law professors, and
other experienced and highly respected BIA members with
159
substantial seniority.
These actions were unprecedented. In the then–sixty-three–year
history of the BIA, no attorney general had ever before removed one
160
of its members for any reason. During the one-year interval
between the announcement of the impending cuts and the
announcement of specific names, the effects of Attorney General
Ashcroft’s decision were striking. The empirical study identified
several BIA members whose percentages of rulings in favor of
161
noncitizens dropped suddenly and substantially. The patterns of
other BIA members whose rulings had historically been relatively
favorable to immigrants did not change during the one-year transition
162
period; only one of these members survived the purge.

155. See Ricardo Alonso-Zaldivar & Jonathan Peterson, 5 on Immigration Board Asked to
Leave, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 12, 2003, at A16 (identifying the five BIA members who were
reassigned).
156. See Peter J. Levinson, The Facade of Quasi-Judicial Independence in Immigration
Appellate Adjudications, 9 BENDER’S IMMIGR. BULL. 1154, 1155–56 (2004).
157. See id.
158. Of the twenty-three then-authorized BIA positions, four were vacant at the time of the
original 2002 announcement, and three other BIA members had left voluntarily before the
announcement of names. Thus, only five “reassign[ments]” were necessary to reduce the Board
to eleven members. Id. at 1155.
159. Id.; see also DORSEY & WHITNEY LLP, supra note 7, at 12 (summarizing the
biographies of the five reassigned BIA members). Analogous events occurred a few years
earlier in Australia. See Stephen H. Legomsky, Refugees, Administrative Tribunals, and Real
Independence: Dangers Ahead for Australia, 76 WASH. U. L.Q. 243, 248–53 (1998).
160. Stephen H. Legomsky, Deportation and the War on Independence, 91 CORNELL L.
REV. 369, 378–79 (2006).
161. See Levinson, supra note 156, at 1156–60 (comparing decisions before and after this
downsizing).
162. See id. (noting that of the five Board members with the most liberal voting histories,
four were reassigned).
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These were only the transitional effects. Whether traceable to
the elimination of the more immigrant-friendly BIA members,
surviving members’ fears of losing their jobs in similar ways,
procedural shortcuts, or a combination of these and perhaps other
causes, the postpurge outcomes in BIA cases have been significantly
163
less favorable to immigrants.
Consistent with the BIA member reassignments, Attorney
General Ashcroft spoke more generally about the nature of BIA
member (and by logical extension, immigration judge) positions and
the attorney general’s powers over their continued service. The
Department’s commentary accompanying the final rule stated:
Each Board member is a Department of Justice attorney who is
appointed by, and may be removed or reassigned by, the Attorney
General. All attorneys in the Department are excepted employees,
subject to removal by the Attorney General, and may be transferred
from and to assignments as necessary to fulfill the Department’s
164
mission.

Although the reassignments in question were limited to the BIA, the
reference to “[a]ll attorneys” makes clear that the attorney general
intended the quoted language to apply to immigration judges as
165
well.
Moreover, as Peter Levinson has noted, the same final rule
specifically amended the Justice Department’s regulations to
downplay the significance of BIA independence. Before the new rule,
the first sentence of the BIA regulations had unequivocally
emphasized that BIA members were to “exercise their independent
166
judgment and discretion in the cases coming before the Board.” The
final rule changed that sentence to make the BIA members simply

163. See DORSEY & WHITNEY LLP, supra note 7, app. 24 (charting the increase in
affirmances after February 2002); Alexander, supra note 7, at 12 (noting that, among other
factors, Board decisions in favor of noncitizens fell 15 percent); Palmer et al., supra note 51, at
96 (showing seventy-two removals compared to eighteen nonremovals from a random sample of
BIA decisions in 2004); Ramji-Nogales et al., supra note 7, at 358–59 (showing decreased rates
of favorable remands in asylum decisions between 2000 and 2003).
164. Board of Immigration Appeals: Procedural Reforms to Improve Case Management, 67
Fed. Reg. 54,878, 54,893 (Aug. 26, 2002) (codified as amended at 8 C.F.R. pt. 1003).
165. See id. (emphasis added). Further, by twice distinguishing between removal and
transfer to other assignments, the attorney general appears to have asserted a power not only to
reassign, but also to remove from office entirely—a sweeping assertion indeed, unless the
attorney general had only affirmative misconduct in mind for the latter.
166. 8 C.F.R. § 3.1(a)(1) (2002).
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“attorneys appointed by the Attorney General to act as the Attorney
167
General’s delegates in the cases that come before them.” Only
much later in the regulation does the reference to BIA independence
168
finally appear, and then only in more qualified language. Coupled
with the recently introduced performance evaluations that assess both
169
productivity and quality of decisions, these actions remind surviving
and future BIA members and immigration judges that they hold their
jobs at the discretion of one of the opposing parties in the cases that
170
come before them.
c. General Supervision and Control by the Attorney General.
Apart from the subtle and not-so-subtle devices for influencing the
adjudication of pending cases described in Section B.3.b, existing law
supplies a number of other mechanisms through which attorneys
general and their delegates supervise and control immigration judges
and the BIA. One of the more direct instruments available for this
purpose is the attorney general’s power to reverse BIA decisions

167. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(a)(1) (2009).
168. See id. § 1003.1(d)(1)(i)–(ii) (subjecting the BIA’s independent judgment to the
governing standards of “the provisions and limitations prescribed by applicable law, regulations,
and procedures, and by decisions of the Attorney General”); Levinson, supra note 156, at 1161
(discussing the changed language between the 2002 regulations and the 2003 regulations).
169. See supra notes 122–23 and accompanying text.
170. Russell Wheeler questions whether immigration judges’ fears of retribution are
widespread. He observes that, unlike the BIA members, immigration judges have not actually
been purged. Moreover, he argues, if immigration judges acted out of a pervasive fear of
intrusion, one would expect uniform results in favor of the government, a phenomenon that has
not occurred. Russell R. Wheeler, Response, Practical Impediments to Structural Reform and
the Promise of Third Branch Analytic Methods: A Reply to Professors Baum and Legomsky, 59
DUKE L.J. 1847, 1851–52 (2010). It is true that immigration judges have not experienced an
actual purge, and admittedly both their degree of fear and the magnitude of the effect it might
have on their decisions would be nearly impossible to determine empirically. In a survey of
adjudicators, acknowledgments of bending the outcomes to meet superiors’ preferences are
likely to be rare, even if that has indeed been the case and even if those propensities were all
conscious and deliberate. But I cannot agree that a pervasive fear would have been expected to
produce a higher degree of uniformity. Many variables might influence judges’ susceptibility to
political pressures: family circumstances; financial pressures; whether they desire to remain in
their present positions long term; the stages of their careers; the availability of other realistic job
options; their own personal levels of courage, integrity, and personal and professional pride; and
their own predictions about how much their supervisors will care about the particular issue and
what their supervisors’ preferences will be. The degree to which fear of adverse job
consequences drives adjudicatory decisions will therefore vary from one adjudicator to another,
and thus the absence of uniform outcomes tells us little or nothing about the magnitude of the
problem. Legomsky, supra note 160, at 397–98.
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171

unilaterally. Though I have general objections to agency head
172
review of adjudicatory decisions, I must acknowledge its common
use as a tool for achieving agency coherence and agency policy
primacy without the logistical burdens of notice-and-comment
173
rulemaking.
In the present context, agency head review is
particularly troublesome because the agency head is the attorney
general, who serves as the nation’s chief law enforcement official.
Allowing a law enforcement official to reverse the decision of an
adjudicatory tribunal is problematic—particularly in proceedings in
which the government is one of the opposing parties.
In theory, empowering attorneys general to review and reverse
BIA decisions makes them more politically accountable for the BIA’s
shortcomings. In practice, that benefit is of small consolation. As the
nation’s chief law enforcement officer, the attorney general has an
inherent incentive to care more about some shortcomings than others.
The legitimate interests in enhancing the speed of the
decisionmaking, and thus the productivity, of the adjudicators and
staff can conflict with other legitimate interests like the accuracy of
174
outcomes and the fairness of procedures. The attorney general’s
enforcement responsibilities might well dictate the relative priorities
assigned to those conflicting interests.
More generally, both the governing statute and the Justice
Department’s regulations prescribe attorney general supervision of
175
immigration judges. The attorney general appoints the director of
176
who in turn is “responsible for the direction and
EOIR,

171. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(h) (requiring the BIA to refer cases to the attorney general on
demand).
172. See Legomsky, supra note 126, at 458–62 (refuting arguments in favor of agency head
review). The U.S. Commission on Immigration Reform also objected to attorney general review
of BIA decisions. See U.S. COMM’N ON IMMIGRATION REFORM, supra note 7, at 178 (listing the
Commission’s qualms with agency head review and suggesting that review should be
independent of enforcement).
173. See Legomsky, supra note 126, at 458–62 (discussing the popularity of agency head
review); Paul R. Verkuil et al., Report for Recommendation 92-7: The Federal Administrative
Judiciary, in 2 ADMINISTRATIVE CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES: RECOMMENDATIONS
AND REPORTS 771, 1004 (1992) (discussing formal agency review of adjudications).
174. Several scholars have considered the phenomenon of agencies’ tunnel vision. See, e.g.,
STEPHEN G. BREYER, BREAKING THE VICIOUS CIRCLE 11–19 (1994) (finding tunnel vision in
the EPA’s hazardous waste cleanup policies); Nina A. Mendelson, Chevron and Preemption,
102 MICH. L. REV. 737, 781 (2004) (finding tunnel vision in the EPA’s general prioritization of
its own programmatic goals).
175. See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(b)(4) (2006); 8 C.F.R. § 1001.1(l).
176. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.0(a).
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The
supervision” of the BIA and the immigration judges.
supervisory powers of the director of EOIR include the authority to
set time frames for the disposition of cases and to evaluate the
performances of the EOIR component parts and the individual
178
adjudicators who staff them. The regulations specify that neither the
director of EOIR nor the chair of the BIA may “direct the result of
an adjudication,” but they qualify that prohibition by providing that it
“shall not be construed to limit” the management authority of either
179
the director of EOIR or the chair of the BIA. The qualification
renders the prohibition on administrators directing the outcomes of
cases ambiguous at best, and potentially meaningless at worst, as
180
evidenced by the chief immigration judge episode outlined earlier.
Both the president of the National Association of Immigration Judges
(NAIJ) and the U.S. Commission on Immigration Reform have
criticized this general scheme for allowing the nation’s chief
prosecutor and law enforcement officer to direct and supervise
181
adjudicatory tribunals.
The attorney general’s supervisory powers have generated
several specific concerns, including the Department’s control over
adjudicatory resources. Writing at a time when the immigration
judges were not only within the Justice Department but also within
the INS, former BIA Chair Maurice Roberts lamented a law
enforcement agency’s control of adjudicatory resources. He observed
that the local INS offices controlled immigration judges’ “office
space, hearing facilities, equipment, supplies, clerical and
transcription support, interpreter service, travel authorization and
reimbursement, library and research facilities, calendars, maintenance
182
of case files, and other services.” Today the immigration judges and
the BIA members are within EOIR, a purely adjudicatory operation,
but, as noted in this Section, the director of EOIR is still a
subordinate of the attorney general. As Judge Marks, president of the
177. Id. § 1003.0(b)(1).
178. Id. § 1003.0(b)(1)(ii) (immigration judges and BIA); id. § 1003.1(a)(2)(i)(C)–(D) (BIA,
powers subdelegated to the Chair of the BIA).
179. Id. §§ 1003.0(c), 1003.1(a)(2)(ii).
180. See supra notes 150–52 and accompanying text.
181. See U.S. COMM’N ON IMMIGRATION REFORM, supra note 7, at 178 (criticizing the
agency head review model); Marks, supra note 7, at 3–4 (offering criticism of the system from
the Honorable Dana Leigh Marks, current president of the NAIJ).
182. Roberts, supra note 7, at 8; see also Levinson, supra note 7, at 646 (describing
immigration judges’ dependence on district directors and regional commissioners for practical
necessities).
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NAIJ, has pointed out, the attorney general is not only the nation’s
chief law enforcement officer, but also the official responsible for the
Office of Immigration Litigation, the agency that represents the
183
government against the immigrant in federal court. To Judge
Marks, an adjudicative tribunal’s dependence on an official
184
responsible for both law enforcement and prosecution is unhealthy.
Beyond physical resources, the present chain of command has
hindered immigration judges in another important way. In 1996,
Congress granted immigration judges a contempt power to be
185
exercised “under regulations prescribed by the Attorney General.”
To date, however, the attorney general has never issued the necessary
regulations, apparently because the former INS and its successors did
not want their trial attorneys subject to discipline by other Justice
186
Department attorneys, even if the latter are judges. The practical
consequence has been that immigration judges have little leverage in
enforcing deadlines against government attorneys, a handicap that
187
often delays the completion of removal proceedings.
Attorney-general control over the adjudication system has also
permitted the Justice Department to introduce several asymmetries,
all of which consciously or unconsciously put a thumb on the scale in
favor of the government and against the immigrant. The one-way
effects of AWOs, which incentivize BIA affirmances, have already
188
been noted in Section B.2. In addition, the Justice Department’s
proposed Codes of Conduct expressly authorize immigration judges
and BIA members to discuss pending cases ex parte with Department

183. Marks, supra note 7, at 3–4.
184. See id. at 4 (citing this shared responsibility as a flaw in the immigration court
structure).
185. Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L. No.
104-208, div. C, § 304, 110 Stat. 3009-546, 3009-589 (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. §
1229a(b)(1) (2006)).
186. Marks, supra note 7, at 10.
187. See Immigration Reform and the Reorganization of Homeland Defense: Hearing Before
the Subcomm. on Immigration of the Comm. on the Judiciary, 107th Cong. 75 (2002) (statement
of Dana Marks Keener, President, National Association of Immigration Judges); DANA MARKS
KEENER & DENISE NOONAN SLAVIN, POSITION PAPER: AN INDEPENDENT IMMIGRATION
COURT: AN IDEA WHOSE TIME HAS COME 9 (2002), available at http://www.woodrow.org/
teachers/esi/2002/CivilLiberties/Projects/PositionPaperImmigrationJudges.pdf .
188. For the observations that AWOs take less time to produce than reversals with reasoned
opinions and that affirmances, in turn, systematically favor the government because 85 to 93
percent of all BIA appeals are filed by the immigrants, see supra notes 118–29 and
accompanying text.
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officials—but not with the immigrants (who are the opposing parties)
189
or their counsel.
These various impediments to the decisional independence and
neutrality of the immigration judges and the BIA are more
consequential than they might first appear. The combination of the
loss of decisional independence at the administrative level and the
sweeping restrictions on judicial review enacted in 1996 has meant
that, for broad categories of removal cases, there is no longer true
190
decisional independence at any stage of the process. Part IV.C.1
explores the implications of that loss more fully.
4. Suspect # 4: The Bad Apples. Every barrel of 232 people
presumably has its bad apples, and the immigration judge corps is no
exception. Ample anecdotal evidence demonstrates that the problem
is not trivial. The courts of appeals have often issued blistering
opinions not only identifying errors by immigration judges and the
BIA on appeal, but also calling attention to incompetence, bias,
hostility, intimidation, abuse, and other unprofessional conduct by
191
some immigration judges. Some critics believe the problem is
192
widespread,
with one suggesting it has reached “crisis”
193
proportions.

189. See Codes of Conduct for the Immigration Judges and Board Members, 72 Fed. Reg.
35,510, 35,511 (June 28, 2007) (“An immigration judge’s communications with other employees
of the Department of Justice shall not be considered ex parte communications unless those
employees are witnesses in a pending or impending proceeding before the immigration judge
and the communication involves that proceeding.”); id. at 35,512 (“A Board Member’s
communications with other employees of the Department of Justice shall not be considered ex
parte communications unless those employees are witnesses or counsel involved in a pending or
impending proceeding before the Board Member, and the communication involves that
proceeding.”).
190. For the details of that argument, see LEGOMSKY, supra note 149, at 143–76.
191. See Benslimane v. Gonzales, 430 F.3d 828, 829 (7th Cir. 2005) (listing eleven examples);
Qun Wang v. Attorney Gen., 423 F.3d 260, 267–69 (3d Cir. 2005) (discussing additional
examples, and condemning “[t]he tone, the tenor, the disparagement, and the sarcasm’’ of the
immigration judge); Dawoud v. Gonzales, 424 F.3d 608, 610 (7th Cir. 2005) (finding the
immigration judge’s opinion “riddled with inappropriate and extraneous comments’’); LopezUmanzor v. Gonzales, 405 F.3d 1049, 1054 (9th Cir. 2005) (finding the immigration judge’s
assessment of the asylum applicant’s credibility to be “skewed by prejudgment, personal
speculation, bias, and conjecture”).
192. See, e.g., APPLESEED, supra note 7, at 12 (citing “a shocking number of examples of a
lack of professionalism that infects Immigration Court proceedings”); Alexander, supra note 7,
at 15–18 (giving examples and advocating for a public campaign against the worst immigration
judges); Benedetto, supra note 7, at 492–500 (giving examples and urging ethical reforms).
193. Benedetto, supra note 7, at 469.
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The anecdotal nature of the evidence and the inherent difficulty
of quantifying subjective failings render the magnitude of the
problem highly uncertain. Especially difficult is distinguishing those
lapses that reflect the unsuitability of a given individual for a judicial
position from those attributable to the crushing caseloads discussed
earlier in this Section. In fairness to the many immigration judges
whose reputations for competence and professionalism are beyond
doubt, judgments about the number of true bad apples should be
withheld until more systematic evidence is compiled. At present, one
can reliably assume that the worst adjudicators have contributed to
the problems afflicting EOIR, but the extent of that contribution is
impossible to gauge responsibly.
5. A Summary of the Causes. This Section began with a warning
that the lines between the various problems and their root causes
sometimes run in two directions. Figure 1 attempts to summarize the
lines of causation.
Figure 1. Problems in the Immigration Adjudication System.
CAUSES AND EFFECTS
[Arrows lead from causes to effects.]
Procedural
Shortcuts
at BIA

Under‐
Resourcing

Delays
and
Inefficiency

Politicization
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on productivity)

Rushed
Decisions

Inaccuracy

Bad
Apples

Burnout

Inconsistency
More
Appeals

Unacceptability
(including scathing
judicial criticism)

Unequal
Treatment

III. THE USUAL PROPOSED SOLUTIONS
The problems highlighted in Part II are serious, but plausible
solutions exist. The nature of these problems suggests that any
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effective reform must incorporate at least five general principles:
First, there must be realistic funding to ensure adequate quality and
quantity of adjudicators and their support staffs—especially law
clerks and staff attorneys—as well as adequate physical resources.
Second, for reasons discussed in Part IV.C.1, those who perform
adjudicatory functions must have decisional independence. Third,
greater efficiencies (both fiscal efficiencies and reductions of elapsed
times) are critical. Fourth, for reasons discussed in Part IV.C.2, the
generalist check needs to be preserved, preferably at the highest
appellate level. And fifth, the procedural safeguards must be
commensurate with the important individual and public interests at
stake in removal cases.
Only Congress, not the executive branch, can satisfy those
principles. The funding decisions, the realignment of reviewing bodies
essential to the kinds of efficiency gains I suggest in Part IV.C.4, and
the retention of the generalist perspective that only the courts can
supply are exclusively within the power of Congress.
So, too, is the attainment of true decisional independence.
Attorney General Ashcroft’s reassignment of the more immigrantfriendly BIA members in 2003, reinforced by the other components
of politicization discussed in Part II.B.3, has sent a message to
immigration judges and BIA members that displeasing the attorney
general could cost them their jobs. In theory, any attorney general
could issue a regulation intended to restore the adjudicators’ job
security, and I have no reason to doubt the good faith of the current
attorney general. Enduring reforms, however, must focus on
institutions, not individuals. No matter how much trust a given
attorney general might inspire among subordinates, the genie is now
out of the bottle. Every adjudicator will be aware that any action the
DOJ takes to restore the adjudicators’ job security can be undone at
any time by a successor administration or a successor attorney
general. Thus, as long as the power to reassign lies with the
administration, adjudicators can never again feel confident ruling
against the government in close, controversial, or high-visibility cases.
Consequently, only Congress, not the executive branch, can provide
the level of job security that adjudicators need and deserve if they are
to discharge their functions free of political pressures.
Is there a congressional solution that would embody these five
essential principles of a restructured immigration adjudication system:
adequate funding, decisional independence, significantly enhanced
efficiency, preservation of a generalist perspective, and sufficient
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procedural safeguards? Several proposals have surfaced over time.
They include an Article I immigration court; retention of the current
structure but with greater job security for the adjudicators; and the
conversion of EOIR into an independent tribunal outside the
Department of Justice and all other executive departments. In this
Part, I consider the benefits and drawbacks of each proposal.
A. An Article I Immigration Court with Trial and Appellate Divisions
Congress has created a number of Article I specialized courts,
many of which remain in operation today and perform important
194
functions. Over the years, several individuals and organizations
have proposed converting the current immigration judges and BIA
into an Article I immigration court with a trial division and an
195
appellate division. The idea is commendable and in my view would
be an improvement over the status quo. Nonetheless, I have two
concerns:
The first concern is a relative one. If the immigration judges and
BIA members become Article I judges, it is safe to assume that
Congress would not grant them the life tenure enjoyed by Article III
judges. Presumably they would have fixed terms, like the judges on
196
existing Article I courts. A fixed term, however, could theoretically
be either renewable or nonrenewable. If it were nonrenewable, few
accomplished people would aspire to these positions unless they were
already immigration adjudicators or were nearing retirement, as their
midcareer options would be limited when their terms expire.
Renewable terms thus make more sense; in fact, fifteen-year
197
renewable terms appear to be the norm for Article I courts. But if
the terms are renewable, someone must exercise discretion about
whether to renew a particular judge’s term (unless renewal were
made statutorily pro forma in the absence of misconduct). And once
renewal hinges on someone’s subjective judgment, the same fear that
arose after Attorney General Ashcroft’s reassignments—that
controversial, unpopular, or consistently pro-immigrant decisions
194. For a thorough summary, see Paul R. Verkuil & Jeffrey S. Lubbers, Alternative
Approaches to Judicial Review of Social Security Disability Cases, 55 ADMIN. L. REV. 731, 744–
51 (2003).
195. See supra note 7.
196. For statutes establishing term lengths for Article I judges, see infra note 197.
197. See 10 U.S.C. § 942(b)(2) (2006) (U.S. Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces); 26
U.S.C. § 7443(e) (2006) (U.S. Tax Court); 28 U.S.C. § 172(a) (2006) (U.S. Court of Federal
Claims); 38 U.S.C. § 7253(c) (2006) (U.S. Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims).
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would displease the repository of that discretion and trigger
nonrenewal—could reemerge in another form. This vulnerability is at
its peak when the decisionmaker is politically accountable, but even if
the decisionmaker is an Article III judge relatively insulated from the
political process, vulnerabilities would persist because, like anyone
else, judges have ideological views and personality conflicts. In
contrast, Administrative Law Judges (ALJs) can be removed only for
“good cause” and then only after evidentiary hearings before the
198
Merit Systems Protection Board. Thus, though Article I judges
might enjoy greater job security than immigration judges currently
do, they might actually have less job security than they would under
an ALJ model.
If that were the only concern, one might find reassurance in the
various other specialized Article I court models that rely on
199
nonautomatic renewals. The larger concern is judicial review by the
regional courts of appeals. Recent proposals by the National
Association of Immigration Judges and the ABA for an Article I
immigration court would preserve review by the regional courts of
200
appeals. There is no guarantee, however, that Congress will accept
these proposals in their entirety. In particular, it is not at all certain
that Congress would preserve court of appeals review if it were to
make EOIR an Article I court with its own appellate division.
Congress has shown no compunctions about eliminating huge swaths
of judicial review of deportation orders in the past, even without an
201
Article I substitute. One worries that an Article I court with an
appellate division would be the impetus to jettison regional court of

198. See 5 U.S.C. § 7521(a) (2006); Jeffrey S. Lubbers, APA-Adjudication: Is the Quest for
Uniformity Faltering?, 10 ADMIN. L. REV. 65, 72–74 (1996) (presenting a good summary of the
statutory provisions governing appointment and terms of office of ALJs); Jeffrey Scott Wolfe,
Are You Willing to Make the Commitment in Writing? The APA, ALJs, and SSA, 55 OKLA. L.
REV. 203, 226 (2002); U.S. Office of Pers. Mgmt., Qualification Standard for Administrative
Law Judge Positions, http://www.opm.gov/qualifications/alj/alj.asp (last visited Mar. 28, 2010).
199. See, e.g., 38 U.S.C. § 7253(c) (expressly contemplating additional fifteen-year terms for
the judges of the U.S. Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims). For each of the other specialized
Article I courts, renewability must be assumed; the statute authorizes appointments for fifteenyear terms and contains no prohibition on appointment of a judge who has already served one
such term. 10 U.S.C. § 942(b)(2); 26 U.S.C. § 7443(e); 28 U.S.C. § 172(a).
200. COMM’N ON IMMIGRATION, supra note 7, at 43–48; Marks, supra note 7, at 3, 15; see
also Fitz & Schrag, supra note 7, § 101(a) (proposing a draft of a bill that would create an
“independent, professional immigration court system”).
201. Most of the existing restrictions on judicial review of immigration decisions appear in 8
U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2), and in other subsections of § 1252. For a summary of congressional efforts
to trim judicial review of immigration decisions further, see Benson, supra note 7, at 413–14.
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appeals review of deportation orders entirely. In that scenario, the
generalist perspective would be lost. Indeed, the absence of a
provision for review by generalist judges was the principal objection
leveled against one of the early leading proposals for an Article I
202
immigration court.
But suppose Congress were to replace EOIR with an Article I
court that houses both trial and appellate divisions, and further
suppose Congress preserves court of appeals review. Is even that the
optimal solution? It would satisfy at least two of the five vital reform
principles—decisional independence and the retention of a generalist
perspective. If Congress were also to appropriate adequate funds and
mandate sufficient safeguards, it could satisfy two additional
principles. But it would not offer significant efficiency gains, for it
would perpetuate a system that tolerates two largely duplicative
rounds of appellate review.
At first blush, one might question how duplicative these
functions really are. After all, specialist tribunals and generalist courts
offer different advantages. I have suggested elsewhere that, at least
when the specialized forum is an administrative tribunal, it is usually
“faster, cheaper, and procedurally simpler and less formal than
203
courts.” Further, regardless of whether it is an administrative
tribunal in the executive branch or a court in the judicial branch,
specialized expertise is a valuable commodity. Courts, on the other
hand, generally offer greater stature and decisional independence
than administrative tribunals, in addition to contributing a valuable
204
generalist perspective. Thus, a system that combines appellate
review by a specialist tribunal with a right of review in a court of
general jurisdiction admittedly offers advantages over a system that
205
provides only one level of appellate review.
Moreover, one might argue, a second opportunity to spot errors
has intrinsic value. On the surface, this assumption sounds reasonable
enough, but the question remains why one should assume that, in
cases in which the specialist tribunal and a generalist court disagree,
202. See Timothy S. Barker, A Critique of the Establishment of a Specialized Immigration
Court, 18 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 25, 25–27 (1980); Robert E. Juceam & Stephen Jacobs,
Constitutional and Policy Considerations of an Article I Immigration Court, 18 SAN DIEGO L.
REV. 29, 33–34 (1980); James J. Orlow, Comments on “A Specialized Statutory Immigration
Court,” 18 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 47, 50 (1980); Wildes, supra note 76, at 60–62.
203. LEGOMSKY, supra note 149, at 283.
204. The benefits of the generalist perspective are elaborated in Part IV.C.2, infra.
205. See LEGOMSKY, supra note 149, at 280–98.
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the latter is more likely to be right. Do the benefits of generalist
experience usually outweigh the benefits of specialized expertise? Is
the reviewing court more likely to follow more elaborate procedures,
proceed more deliberately, or have more decisional independence?
Perhaps the answer to each of these questions is “yes,
sometimes.” If the tribunal’s rationale is communicable in writing,
then the court can receive the benefits of the tribunal’s accumulated
specialist wisdom while also bringing the court’s own generalist
perspective to bear on the issue. Unlike the administrative tribunal,
which will not have had the benefit of the court’s generalist
perspective, the court of appeals will have the best of both worlds.
Admittedly, not all insights are fully communicable. Suppose, for
example, the tribunal’s decision reflects its predictions, grounded in
its practical experience, of the likely effects of a proposed decision. If
those predictions are largely intuitive, its reasoning might not be
easily transmitted. Even then, however, the combination of the
court’s generalist perspective and due deference to the specialized
practical experience of the tribunal might, at least theoretically,
produce a better decision than if appellate review were limited to
either a single specialized tribunal or a single generalist court. Thus,
transmissible or not, the tribunal’s experiential insights and the
court’s generalist perspective might make for a better decision than
206
either forum would have been able to produce on its own.
Given these typically differing and often complementary
properties of specialized tribunals and generalist courts, I must
concede that a second appellate round can add value. Still, there will
always be at least partial duplication of effort. I do not wish to
exaggerate the duplication, given that some unknowable percentage
of the second appeals will be easy cases capable of quick resolution.
But the duplication will still be substantial, and, as I argue in Part IV,
there is a way to realize the benefits of both kinds of adjudicative
bodies without the inefficiency of a second appellate round.
B. Legislating More Job Security within the Department of Justice
Short of creating an Article I court, Congress could retain the
existing structure of EOIR and simply legislate greater job security
for the immigration judges and BIA members. Congress could, for
example, make EOIR an independent tribunal within the

206. See id. at 292–98.
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Department of Justice, as it did with the U.S. Parole Commission.
Either alternatively or additionally, Congress could make the
208
The ALJ
immigration judges and the BIA members ALJs.
appointment process is freer of political influence, the ALJs’ grade
levels and pay scales are set by the Office of Personnel Management
(OPM) rather than by political actors, and they cannot be removed
from office except for good cause found after an evidentiary hearing
209
before the Merit Systems Protection Board. Any of these options
would restore the adjudicators’ decisional independence. If
accompanied by both adequate funding and appropriate hearing and
appellate procedures, they would satisfy other essential reform
criteria as well.
Like the Article I court proposal, however, each of these options
would require either preserving the inefficiency of two levels of
appellate review or eliminating the only generalist check on the
process. Moreover, keeping EOIR within the Department of Justice,
even under another name, would continue to subject adjudicators to
the budgetary and other logistical decisions of the Department. At
210
one time, I did not find this arrangement disturbing. Similarly, the
president of the National Association of Immigration Judges, though
preferring that EOIR be transferred to an independent executive
branch agency, found its Justice Department location at least
211
preferable to the then-contemplated transfer of EOIR to DHS. The
2003 purge of BIA members and its ominous implications for
adjudicators’ decisional independence from law enforcement
superiors have forced both of us to eat our words and prescribe
212
stronger medicine. Adjudicators’ dependence on law enforcement
officials for not only job security but also daily office needs and
procedural direction is highly problematic for all the reasons
213
discussed earlier. When the former INS was part of the Department
207. Other commentators considered but ultimately rejected that possibility (at a time when
the U.S. Parole Commission was a larger and more permanent agency). See, e.g., Levinson,
supra note 7, at 650–51; Roberts, supra note 7, at 17–18.
208. This option, too, has been considered by others. See, e.g., Levinson, supra note 7, at
649; Roberts, supra note 7, at 16–17.
209. See supra note 198.
210. See Legomsky, supra note 6, at 1378–80.
211. See Immigration Reform and the Reorganization of Homeland Defense, supra note 187,
at 76.
212. See Legomsky, supra note 160, at 405 (favoring an independent executive branch
tribunal); Marks, supra note 7 (favoring an Article I immigration court).
213. See supra Part II.B.3.c.
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of Justice, there might have been some reason to keep EOIR there as
well, on a theory of agency policy coherence. Now that the INS is
defunct, and its functions transferred to DHS, keeping EOIR in the
Justice Department lacks even that advantage.
C. Converting EOIR into an Independent Tribunal outside the Justice
Department
Another option is to make EOIR an independent tribunal, with
trial and appellate divisions, but house it outside the Department of
214
Justice and all other departments. Other such tribunals exist, and
215
some have urged this model for what is now EOIR. Again, the
immigration judges and BIA members could become ALJs in this
new tribunal.
In many ways, an independent adjudicatory tribunal is just an
Article I court by another name. Both perform solely adjudicatory
functions, both are in the executive branch, and both are independent
of all existing government departments. Moreover, adjudicators in
both bodies would be immune from the threat of removal from office
because of disagreements over outcomes. By simultaneously
providing job security to adjudicators and preventing the attorney
general from exerting budgetary and logistical leverage or regulating
their procedures, both models would avoid the major disadvantages
of the internal Department of Justice option.
216
Still, there are some differences between these two models. An
Article I court would offer greater stature to adjudicators. Stature
and respect might restore the existing immigration judges’ morale (if
they are grandfathered or reappointed), and perhaps it would expand
the pool of future applicants by making the positions more attractive.
But an Article I court would also have comparative disadvantages.
One writer fears that an Article I immigration court would require an

214. Examples include the Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission and the
Federal Mine Safety and Health Review Commission. See Levinson, supra note 7, at 649 n.39,
651; Verkuil & Lubbers, supra note 194, at 773.
215. See, e.g., U.S. COMM’N ON IMMIGRATION REFORM, supra note 7, at 178–82; Orlow,
supra note 202, at 50. The ABA Commission, which favors an Article I immigration court, has
proposed the independent tribunal model as a fallback position. ABA, Resolution 114F
Adopted by the House of Delegates 13–15 (Feb. 8–9, 2010), available at http://www.abanet.org/
leadership/2010/midyear/daily_jourmal/114F.pdf; COMM’N ON IMMIGRATION, supra note 7, at
43–48.
216. See ABA, supra note 215, at 8–9 (emphasizing the stature and prestige of Article I
judgeships); COMM’N ON IMMIGRATION, supra note 7, at 45 (same).
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“overjudicialized, formal process attendant to the to-be-created
217
agency’s status as ‘court[,]’” thus sacrificing speed and flexibility.
This problem, however, could be solved simply by drafting rules of
procedure that take into account the particular subject matter and
any special needs it presents for procedural simplicity.
Other considerations could become more consequential. The
concern expressed in Section A—that an independent entity with an
appellate division might prove too tempting a justification for
Congress to abolish Article III review—might be exacerbated if the
new entity is called a court, albeit one established under Article I. In
addition, the usual selection process for an Article I court is
218
presidential appointment followed by Senate confirmation,
a
process that some have specifically urged for an Article I immigration
219
court. Each of the other Article I courts, however, has only between
220
three and nineteen judges. A court with more than two hundred
221
judges would constantly produce far more vacancies and thus
require many more presidential appointments and Senate
confirmation hearings. This volume would have taxed the Senate
even in the past; it seems particularly ill suited to the highly charged
current congressional climate, in which every confirmation hearing is
a potential food fight. If Congress were to create an Article I
immigration court but dispense with the usual presidential-Senate
appointment process, however, this problem would not arise.
Similarly, if the presidential-Senate appointment procedure were
confined to the appellate stage, the problem would remain but the
222
number of senatorial stalemates would be greatly reduced.
Finally, like both of the preceding options, the independent
tribunal model would entail either entrenching the two largely

217. Orlow, supra note 202, at 49.
218. See 10 U.S.C. § 942(b)(1) (2006) (U.S. Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces); 26
U.S.C. § 7443(b) (2006) (U.S. Tax Court); 28 U.S.C. § 171(a) (2006) (U.S. Court of Federal
Claims); 38 U.S.C. § 7253(b) (2006) (U.S. Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims).
219. See, e.g., Marks, supra note 7, at 3; Roberts, supra note 7, at 19; cf. Wildes, supra note
76, at 54–55, 62 (lauding the presidential appointment process, though favoring either ALJs or
an independent tribunal over an Article I immigration court).
220. See 10 U.S.C. § 942(a) (five judges); 26 U.S.C. § 7443(a) (nineteen judges); 28 U.S.C.
§ 171(a) (sixteen judges); 38 U.S.C. § 7253(a) (three to seven judges).
221. As of August 20, 2009, there were 232 immigration judges. Komis, supra note 73, at 1.
222. The ABA Proposed Resolutions and Fitz and Schrag have proposed this arrangement.
ABA, supra note 215, at 10; COMM’N ON IMMIGRATION, supra note 7, at 68; Fitz & Schrag,
supra note 7, § 102(a)(4).
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duplicative rounds of appellate review or sacrificing the generalist
Article III check on the process.
IV. AN ARTICLE III IMMIGRATION COURT
STAFFED BY GENERALIST JUDGES
Look for items that are of low cost to you and high benefit to them,
223
and vice versa.

As one icon of negotiation theory emphasizes, a successful
negotiator looks beyond positions to identify the motivating
224
interests. Moreover, even when the interests of two negotiating
parties conflict, a particular item might have a high benefit to one
225
party and a low cost to the other.
Can these principles possibly be of use in a battlefield like
immigration adjudication, in which the opposing sides seem so
hopelessly at odds over both factual perceptions (are most asylum
claimants genuine refugees or just people looking for a way to stay in
the United States?) and priorities (do I care more about ensuring fair
and accurate outcomes, or about speeding up the process and
eliminating the backlogs at low fiscal cost?)? I argue here that,
especially in this highly charged debate, focusing on the interests and
priorities of the typically opposing sides can produce an agreement in
which each side achieves what is most important to it while sacrificing
only what is least important to it.
What I have posited as the five critical elements of any effective
reform of immigration adjudication—adequate funding, decisional
independence, enhanced efficiency, the preservation of a generalist
check, and fair procedures—are goals to which different actors assign
different priorities. Each of them, however, is of vital importance to
some. Consequently, a proposed reform that leaves any of these
elements unsatisfied is likely to go nowhere. As Part III illustrates,
although any number of reform models would represent substantial
improvements over the status quo, each of the proposals considered
to this point fails to meet at least one of these criteria. Among other
things, each of them requires a choice between losing what remains of

223. ROGER FISHER, WILLIAM URY & BRUCE PATTON, GETTING TO YES: NEGOTIATING
AGREEMENT WITHOUT GIVING IN 79 (2d ed. 1991).
224. Id. at 42.
225. Id. at 76.
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a generalist, Article III check versus retaining a largely superfluous
second round of appellate review.
A. The Proposal
As an alternative, I propose (a) converting the immigration
judges into ALJs housed in an independent executive branch tribunal
and (b) replacing both the BIA and review by the regional courts of
appeals with an Article III immigration appellate court staffed by
generalist judges. The details of this proposal and their rationales
appear in Part IV.D, but the key elements can be summarized as
follows:
1. With respect to the immigration judges, I would adopt any one
of the reform proposals discussed in Part III. The benefits of
insulating these adjudicators from the Justice Department’s
budgetary and logistical pressures inform my preference to convert
the Office of the Chief Immigration Judge into a new, independent
adjudicatory tribunal located within the executive branch but outside
all departments. I would make the immigration judges ALJs because
226
of the advantages of that arrangement over an Article I court. Until
a more euphonious name is devised, the new tribunal could be called
the Office of the Administrative Law Judges for Immigration
(OALJI), and the adjudicators would be Administrative Law Judges
for Immigration (ALJIs). My proposal calls for a qualified
grandfathering of the current immigration judges. Subsequent
appointments would be made by a special Commission described in
Section D.1.a.
2. This proposal would establish a new Article III United States
Court of Appeals for Immigration to replace both the BIA and the
current role of the regional courts of appeals in immigration cases.
The jurisdiction of the new court would generally track that of the
current BIA, thus indirectly repealing the 1996 bars on Article III
review of large categories of removal orders. The new court could sit
in one centralized location or have multiple seats, as discussed in Part
IV.B.7.
3. I would staff the new court with generalist Article III judges
drawn from the U.S. district courts and regional courts of appeals for
fixed terms, for example two years. For this purpose, each circuit
would contribute district and circuit judges proportionately to the

226. See supra notes 208–09 and accompanying text.
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total number of district and circuit judges in that circuit. The Judicial
Council of each circuit would make selections from the pool of
eligible judges. Only active Article III judges with a minimum
number of years of service on federal courts of general jurisdiction (I
propose three years) would be eligible for the regular two-year
assignments to this new court. To fill a temporary need for additional
judges, it would be possible to assign other active judges and senior
judges to the new court on an ad hoc basis.
4. The new court would have its own support staff, including both
permanent and term law clerks and staff attorneys.
5. Both parties—the immigrant and DHS—would have the
statutory right to appeal the decision of the ALJI to this new court,
just as they now both have the right to appeal to the BIA. The new
court would also have jurisdiction over several miscellaneous orders
that roughly parallel the current jurisdiction of the BIA.
B. Constitutionality
Before assessing the policy implications of this proposal, it is
necessary to address one preliminary question: is it constitutional?
Article III, Section 1 of the United States Constitution vests the
federal judicial power in a supreme court and any inferior courts that
227
Congress chooses to establish. It then provides that the judges of
both the supreme and inferior courts “shall hold their Offices during
good Behaviour” and that their compensation shall not be reduced
228
while they remain in office. These provisions protect federal judges’
decisional independence by insulating them from political pressures.
Nowhere, however, does the constitutional text say that all
federal adjudication must be by Article III judges. Otherwise all
federal
administrative
adjudicatory
tribunals
would
be
unconstitutional. Rather, the Supreme Court has marked out the
229
limitations on non–Article III adjudication. In three leading cases,
the Court has held that non–Article III courts and tribunals may
adjudicate public rights, and that they apparently may adjudicate

227. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
228. Id.
229. See Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 853–56 (1986);
N. Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 68–71 (1982); Crowell v.
Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 48–53 (1932). See generally MICHAEL ASIMOW & RONALD M. LEVIN,
STATE AND FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE LAW § 7.3 (3d ed. 2009) (examining Congress’s power
to delegate adjudicatory authority to agencies).
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even private rights provided that an Article III court has independent
power to decide all questions of law and jurisdictional fact. Although
the line is not entirely clear, it appears that for these purposes, public
rights are those arising between the government and private persons,
whereas private rights are those that involve the liability of one
230
individual to another.
Thus, there is no apparent Article III problem here. First,
whatever ambiguities the distinction between private rights and
public rights might generate in other contexts, the rights adjudicated
in removal proceedings are public rights under any imaginable
standard, because they arise as between the individual immigrant and
231
the government. Indeed, in Crowell v. Benson, the Supreme Court
specifically mentioned immigration as a “familiar’’ example of a
232
public right. Second, my proposal encompasses independent review
by an Article III court. Third, the current system already lodges the
adjudicatory power in an administrative tribunal (EOIR), and the
only issue is whether to transfer that authority to either a more
independent adjudicatory tribunal within the executive branch or (for
appellate review) an Article III court. As such, my proposal does not
raise any constitutional issues not already present in the seemingly
uncontested existing structure. To the contrary, it expands the role of
Article III judges in immigration cases. From this point on, therefore,
constitutionality will be assumed.
C. Policy Benefits and Costs
The adjudication model urged in this Article has several
important policy advantages over both the status quo and the other
reform proposals discussed in Part III. It would depoliticize what is,
and should be, an adjudicatory process. Further, it would preserve
both specialized expertise and the generalist perspective in appellate
review. Additionally, it would repeal the principal restrictions that
Congress placed on Article III judicial review of removal orders in
1996. By consolidating the current two rounds of largely duplicative
appellate review into one, this proposal would promote fiscal
efficiency and speed final dispositions. Because the judges assigned to
the new court would be generalists drawn from the district courts and
the courts of appeals, this proposal would offer judicial councils the
230. N. Pipeline, 458 U.S. at 69–70.
231. Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22 (1932).
232. Id. at 50.
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flexibility to reassign judges to their original posts if caseload
fluctuations warrant.
Costs must be acknowledged. Centralization, though possibly
contributing to more uniform results, lessens the opportunity for
beneficial cross-court discourse, creates various logistical challenges
concerning panel deliberation and oral argument, and potentially
concentrates more than optimal power in a single institution.
Moreover, some significant percentage of the federal district and
circuit judges are likely to be unenthusiastic about the prospect of a
two-year assignment to the new court. The discussion in the
remainder of this Section suggests that these costs, although real, are
either minor or easily mitigated.
1. Depoliticization. This proposal aims to depoliticize the
immigration adjudication process in several ways. At the hiring stage,
the proposal would substitute ALJs for the current immigration
judges and Article III judges for BIA members. The tawdry hiring
practices that so badly tarnished EOIR and other components of the
233
Department of Justice have since been corrected, but without
congressional action, nothing prevents future Justice Department and
White House officials from lapsing. The ALJI hiring process
proposed here is merit based. Similarly, BIA review would give way
to review by Article III judges. Appointments of federal judges are
admittedly political, but the requirements of presidential nomination
and Senate confirmation provide transparency and at least some
degree of merits scrutiny.
One special problem deserves mention. The Article III judges
who are assigned to the Court of Appeals for Immigration would
234
ultimately be selected by other judges. As Professor Theodore
Ruger has observed, assignments of judges by other judges are not
235
without problems. Several statutes, for example, have authorized
the Chief Justice of the United States to reassign judges temporarily
236
to different courts. These arrangements eliminate the democratic
safeguards of appointment by politically accountable actors—the
president and the Senate. Moreover, a Chief Justice can select judges

233. See supra notes 134–40 and accompanying text.
234. The proposed assignment procedure is detailed in Part IV.D.2.a, infra.
235. Theodore W. Ruger, The Judicial Appointment Power of the Chief Justice, 7 U. PA. J.
CONST. L. 341, 343–47 (2004).
236. Id. at 343 nn.5–8, 359–67.
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with particular political viewpoints. That power is especially
problematic when an assignment is to a specialized court, because it
permits the appointment of judges who hold particular views
concerning the particular subject matter—a virtual recipe for
237
manipulating the outcomes of cases. By matching specific judges to
specific subject matters, this practice also violates the norm of random
238
assignment of judges to cases. The problem is not academic. As
Ruger shows, at least two Chief Justices (Rehnquist and, to a lesser
extent, Burger) often made strategic assignment choices based on
239
their own substantive preferences.
My proposal does not eliminate these dangers, as some judges
would still appoint or assign other judges. At both the trial level and
the appellate level, however, the proposal diffuses the selection
power by spreading it out among a collective group, thus greatly
diminishing these various concerns.
Hiring aside, my proposal is designed to restore decisional
independence at both the trial and appellate levels of immigration
adjudication, principally by enhancing the job security of
adjudicators. Unlike the current immigration judges and BIA
members, the ALJIs and Article III judges of the Court of Appeals
for Immigration need not be concerned that one of the opposing
parties is a law enforcement agency. That party would no longer have
the power to terminate their employment if it were unhappy with the
decision.
Admittedly, decisional independence—meaning adjudicators’
freedom to decide cases as they believe the evidence and the law
240
dictate—has costs. As discussed in more detail elsewhere, these
costs relate to the inherent absence of political accountability,
inappropriate judicial activism, potential public backlash, and
possible impediments to agency policy coherence.
When the function of a public actor falls clearly within the realm
of adjudication, however, the usual assumption has been that the
237. Id. at 343–44.
238. Id. at 372. See generally Adam M. Samaha, Randomization in Adjudication, 51 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 1, 6–8 (2009) (defending random assignments of cases to judges).
239. Ruger, supra note 235, at 390–95; see also Theodore W. Ruger, Chief Justice
Rehnquist’s Appointments to the FISA Court: An Empirical Perspective, 101 NW. U. L. REV. 239,
240 (2007) (demonstrating empirically that Chief Justice Rehnquist disproportionately assigned
to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISA) those judges who held conservative views
on the specific fourth amendment issues that FISA was charged with deciding).
240. Legomsky, supra note 160, at 392–94.
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benefits of decisional independence outweigh its costs. If
“adjudication” is “the power to determine the rights or duties of
241
particular persons based on their individual circumstances,” then
the decisions that immigration judges, the BIA, and the courts of
appeals now make in removal cases obviously qualify.
The benefits of decisional independence in an adjudicative
context are compelling. Most importantly, decisional independence is
rooted in theories of procedural justice. People who decide cases
should base their decisions on their honest assessments of the
evidence and their honest interpretations of the relevant law, not on
the basis of which outcomes are most likely to please the officials who
have the power to fire them. In addition, decisional independence
serves to avoid defensive judging (playing it safe); to protect
unpopular individuals, minorities, and viewpoints; to operationalize
separation of powers; to nourish public confidence in the integrity of
the justice system; to prevent “reverse social Darwinism,” in which
the most honest and most courageous adjudicators are the ones first
culled from the herd; to make the positions attractive enough to
recruit the most talented candidates; and to sustain a continuity of
242
interpretation from one administration to the next. To be clear,
none of these considerations should immunize an adjudicator from
discipline or even removal for unprofessional conduct. But sanctions
grounded in policy-based or ideological differences with one’s
superiors are another matter.
Finally, this proposal seeks to end the general supervision and
control of an adjudicative body by a law enforcement agency. As
discussed in Part II.B.3.c, allowing law enforcement officials not only
to reverse the decisions of adjudicators, but also to control staffing
and other resources that adjudicators require, has created an
unhealthy state of dependency.
All these effects of depoliticization assume larger significance
when one considers that existing law bars judicial review of large
243
categories—perhaps a majority—of final removal orders. This
proposal, therefore, neutralizes the 1996 court-stripping legislation.
Instead of a right to appeal all immigration judge removal orders to

241. ASIMOW & LEVIN, supra note 229, at 398.
242. These and other theories of decisional independence are discussed in Legomsky, supra
note 160, at 394–401.
243. For a summary of the more important 1996 constraints on judicial review of removal
orders, see supra notes 34–38 and accompanying text.
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the BIA, this proposal would create a right to appeal those same
decisions to an Article III Court of Appeals for Immigration. Thus,
all removal orders, including those that rest on discretionary decisions
and those involving the crime-related deportability grounds, would
again become reviewable by independent, Article III judges with
generalist backgrounds—but instead of, not in addition to, review by
the BIA.
2. Generalists and Specialists. Assigning federal district and
circuit judges to two-year rotations on a new U.S. Court of Appeals
for Immigration is a have-your-cake-and-eat-it-too solution. In the
past, one of the most serious objections to replacing the regional
courts of appeals with a single specialized immigration appellate court
244
has been the loss of the generalist perspective. At the same time, my
proposed abolition of the BIA—essential if the present two rounds of
appellate review are to be consolidated into one—necessitates some
alternative source of specialized expertise. This proposal addresses
both needs by staffing a specialized court with judges who have had
several years of experience on federal courts of general jurisdiction.
Rotational assignments to specialized courts are not a novel idea, but
the few known examples have entailed only standby arrangements, in
which judges continue to serve full time on their home courts except
when particular cases require their temporary services on the
245
specialized courts. In those regimes, the judges have had far less
opportunity to develop significant specialized expertise.
Professor Lawrence Baum makes the excellent point that some
judges on the existing regional courts of appeals have already
acquired a good deal of specialized expertise simply by having

244. See Barker, supra note 202, at 27; Juceam & Jacobs, supra note 202, at 33–34; Orlow,
supra note 202, at 60–62.
245. FISA is the most significant example. The Chief Justice of the United States assigns
eleven district judges, at least three of whom must live within twenty miles of Washington, D.C.
They travel to the court as needed. Fed. Judicial Ctr., Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court,
http://www.fjc.gov/history/home.nsf/page/fisc_bdy (last visited Mar. 30, 2010); U.S. Courts, The
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court and the Court of Review, http://www.uscourts.gov/
outreach/topics/fisa/courtofreview.html (last visited Mar. 30, 2010). The Temporary Emergency
Court of Appeals was the other major example. The Chief Justice was authorized to appoint
three or more district or circuit judges to serve part time for indefinite terms. It was abolished in
1992 and its jurisdiction was transferred to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit.
Fed. Judicial Ctr., Temporary Emergency Court of Appeals, 1971–1992, http://www.fjc.gov/
history/home.nsf/page/temp_appeals!OpenDocument&Click= (last visited Mar. 30, 2010).
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246

handled a large number of immigration cases. Outside the Second
and Ninth Circuits, however, the number of judges who could
247
realistically claim that kind of expertise is small. At any rate, the
court I am proposing would be a different animal entirely. The judges
would be totally immersed in immigration law for two years. They
would constantly learn from one another, from a specialized support
staff with institutional memory, and from specialized books and other
resources. Moreover, because the judges will be adjudicating nothing
but immigration cases for two years, it will be worthwhile to invest in
their continuing specialized education.
What, precisely, does specialized expertise contribute to
248
adjudication? In several ways, it enhances the quality of the final
decisions. Specialists’ knowledge of the governing statutory scheme
and their repeated exposure to the practical consequences of past
interpretations can help them reach results that are both faithful to
249
the law and pragmatic. Experts should be well equipped to identify
the right questions; they will also be more familiar with recurring
legislative facts and related statutory provisions that add context to
the provisions they are interpreting. This knowledge lessens their
dependency on counsel and staff for basic information and mitigates
the risk that a party will win or lose because of an imbalance in the
skills or efforts of the opposing attorneys. When parties appear pro
se, the expertise of the adjudicator can be at least a partial substitute
for counsel. In addition to the knowledge that the adjudicators
themselves furnish, the structure of a specialized court enables judges
to draw on the collective wisdom of their specialized colleagues, a

246. Lawrence Baum, Judicial Specialization and the Adjudication of Immigration Cases, 59
DUKE L.J. 1501, 1550–51 (2010).
247. Id. at 1550–52.
248. For a more comprehensive catalog of the benefits and costs of specialized adjudication,
see STEPHEN H. LEGOMSKY, SPECIALIZED JUSTICE: COURTS, ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNALS,
AND A CROSS-NATIONAL THEORY OF SPECIALIZATION 7–19 (1990).
249. David R. Woodward & Ronald M. Levin, In Defense of Deference: Judicial Review of
Agency Action, 31 ADMIN. L. REV. 320, 329, 332 (1979). Others have similarly hailed specialists’
“superior degree of technical competence,’’ as well as their abilities to predict pragmatically
whether nonliteral interpretations would “unsettle the statutory scheme.” Cass R. Sunstein &
Adrian Vermeule, Interpretation and Institutions, 101 MICH. L. REV. 885, 928 (2003). As an
argument for affording specialist decisionmakers more leeway than generalist judges to depart
from the literal statutory text, these latter assertions have drawn a sharp rebuke from Judge
Richard Posner. He argued that specialized expertise can lead to loose construction (a result he
disfavors) and that many “generalist’’ judges also possess specialized expertise, for example in
evidence law or criminal law. Richard A. Posner, Reply: The Institutional Dimension of
Statutory and Constitutional Interpretation, 101 MICH. L. REV. 952, 964 (2003).
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specialized support staff, and specialized books and other resources.
Familiarity with the relevant cases can help create a consistent body
of case law—by reducing the chance of overlooking a case on point,
by avoiding unintentionally broad or misleading language in opinions,
and by affirmatively contributing helpful dicta. Specialized courts can
further enhance consistency by concentrating decisionmaking in a
smaller number of individuals.
These benefits assume particular importance in immigration. As
the Introduction to this Article points out, the statutes, regulations,
and case law that govern U.S. immigration law are exceptionally
large, complex, and organizationally intricate. The law is also
unusually dynamic. Understanding the overall design of the statutory
scheme and keeping up with developments are correspondingly
challenging in this field. Moreover, many fact patterns recur. Those
who adjudicate asylum cases, for example, must often assess the
human rights practices that prevail in the particular countries from
250
which the applicants are fleeing. Familiarity with common fact
patterns facilitates both broader understanding and consistent
outcomes.
Apart from its contribution to accurate decisions, specialized
expertise enhances the efficiency of the process. All else equal, for a
given level of accuracy, one who is familiar with the general legal
backdrop should require less time to decide cases than one who has to
start from scratch. The specialized adjudicator should also need less
background information from counsel. These efficiencies allow the
tribunal and the parties to devote their time and resources to less
repetitive and more productive tasks.
Specialization also has costs, but my proposal largely eliminates
them. The most obvious cost is the loss of the generalist perspective;
the present proposal preserves the generalist perspective by insisting
on a minimum amount of experience on a federal court of general
jurisdiction. Views and attitudes might ossify more readily among
specialists, who have had abundant time and occasion to develop
their views, and cynicism might develop over time. The generalist
judges who would staff the new U.S. Court of Appeals for
Immigration will arrive without the same opportunities to have

250. Protection will generally hinge on whether an applicant’s fear of persecution in another
country is “well-founded,” 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a) (2006), or on whether the applicant’s life or
freedom “would be threatened” in a particular country, id. § 1231(b)(3). Those determinations
require assessments of relevant country conditions.
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formed those biases and rigidities, and at any rate they will rotate out
after two years.
Finally, one persistent fear concerning specialized tribunals and
courts is that their specialization gives unhealthy incentives to others
to influence their selection and subsequently their decisions. When a
person’s full-time job will be the adjudication of cases within one
narrowly defined subject area, special interests have a greater
incentive to lobby for or against appointment, and the authorities
who make the appointments have a greater incentive to choose
someone who is similarly minded. After appointments, the danger of
251
capture by special interests becomes more evident. Again, the
proposed reform would greatly minimize those problems. Potential
lobbyists will not know in advance which federal judgeship nominees
will one day serve on the U.S. Court of Appeals for Immigration. The
judges would not occupy those roles until at least three years in the
future, their assignments to the new court would be in the hands of a
collective group of judges rather than a single individual, and the
short duration of the assignment (two years) further minimizes both
the profit in lobbying and the opportunity for capture.
There are also important affirmative advantages to adjudication
252
by generalists. Judges with generalist experience can draw guidance,
analogies, and inspiration from other judicial contexts and can
approach cases with fewer and less-entrenched biases and
preconceptions. A more varied diet of cases might also expand the
recruitment pool by inducing talented individuals to seek out
judgeships or professional staff positions. All of these advantages
have special salience in immigration law, because liberty interests are
at stake and the complex agency framework makes a broad
knowledge of administrative law exceptionally useful. Again, the
proposed framework would utilize that generalist experience by
limiting eligibility for service on the new court to those judges who

251. See LEGOMSKY, supra note 248, at 16; Verkuil & Lubbers, supra note 194, at 756–58
(discussing the effects of specialization on lobbying); Id. at 767 n.181 (acknowledging concerns
that veterans’ groups have captured the Board of Veterans’ Appeals and the Article I U.S.
Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims).
252. See Jason Rathod, Note, Not Peace, but a Sword: Navy v. Egan and the Case Against
Judicial Abdication in Foreign Affairs, 59 DUKE L.J. 595, 617–18 (2009) (invoking the benefits
of a generalist perspective as part of an argument for judicial review of agency security
clearance determinations). See generally LEGOMSKY, supra note 248, at 7–19 (discussing the
benefits and costs of judicial specialization).
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had accumulated the requisite experience on a federal court of
general jurisdiction.
3. Fix ‘96. As discussed in Section D.2.b, this proposal would
give the new immigration court jurisdiction that roughly parallels that
of the current BIA. By doing so, it would effectively negate some of
the more severe constraints that Congress placed on judicial review of
removal orders in 1996. Until that year, virtually all administratively
final deportation orders (as they were then called) were reviewable in
253
the courts of appeals. In 1996, however, Congress slashed judicial
review in numerous ways. Among the most important of these
restrictions were the bars on review of most discretionary decisions
254
and most crime-related removal orders. The inability to appeal
discretionary decisions has had special impact, because, as noted
earlier, the vast majority of noncitizens in removal proceedings apply
255
for various forms of discretionary relief.
Because my proposed Court of Appeals for Immigration would
assume essentially the same jurisdiction as the current BIA, the
practical effect would be to restore the Article III judicial review that
was lost in 1996. The familiar benefits of Article III judicial review of
administrative tribunal decisions, in turn, are ample and discussed
256
elsewhere.
4. Fiscal Cost and Waste. This proposal substantially reduces
fiscal waste and, most likely, overall fiscal costs. Initially, that claim
might seem counterintuitive. After all, the time of federal judges is
typically more costly than the time of the BIA members who decide
these cases today. Nonetheless, the proposed new system would
reduce costs in four ways:
First, for a given number of cases per adjudicator and cases per
law clerk, the costs actually turn out to be lower for the federal courts
than they are for the BIA. Federal judges’ salaries are higher than

253. 8 U.S.C. § 1105(a) (1994).
254. See Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L. No.
104-208, div. C, § 306, 110 Stat. 3009-546, 3009-607 to -608 (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C.
§ 1252(a)(2)(B)–(C) (2006)) (amending section 242(a)(2)(B)–(C) of the Immigration and
Nationality Act). The REAL ID Act of 2005, Pub. L. 109-13, 119 Stat. 302 (codified in scattered
sections of 8 U.S.C.), clarified that both of these bars were subject to exceptions for questions of
law. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(D).
255. See supra notes 34–38 and accompanying text.
256. See LEGOMSKY, supra note 149, at 272–98.
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those of BIA members, but only slightly. The current salaries of
circuit judges and district judges are $184,500 and $174,000,
257
BIA members’ salaries range from $162,900 to
respectively;
258
$171,180 —very close to the salaries of the district judges who would
make up the vast majority of the new appellate adjudicators under my
proposal. More than offsetting that small differential is the fact that
the salary range of the BIA staff attorneys (formally called attorney
advisors) is much higher than that for federal court law clerks. The
259
BIA attorney advisors earn between $86,927 and $153,200 per year.
For federal law clerks, the salary varies with location, but in cities
other than those specifically designated, the usual starting salary is
260
$56,411 (including a cost of living allowance). For the minority of
federal law clerks who serve a second year (and who have been
admitted to Bar membership), the salary, in cities other than those
261
designated, is $67,613. And in both the BIA and the federal courts,
the law clerks (or attorney advisors at the BIA) far outnumber the
262
judges (BIA members). Thus, the much higher clerk salaries at the
257. COLA for Federal Judges in 2009, THE THIRD BRANCH (U.S. Courts, Wash., D.C.),
Mar. 2009, at 3, available at http://www.uscourts.gov/ttb/2009-03/article03.cfm?WT.cg_n=TTB_
Mar09_article03_tableOfContents.
258. Komis, supra note 73, at 2.
259. Id.
260. Recent law school graduates usually qualify for grade JSP-11, step 1 appointments;
after one year of postgraduation experience and Bar membership, the grade is usually JSP-12,
step 1. Online System for Clerkship Application and Review, Qualifications, Salary and
Benefits, https://oscar.uscourts.gov/drupal/print/18 (last visited Mar. 30, 2010). Including the cost
of living allowance for all cities other than those specifically listed, the 2009 annual salary for
JSP-11, step 1 is $56,411; for JSP-12, step 1, it is $67,613. U.S. COURTS, JUDICIAL SALARY PLAN
PAY RATE TABLE 01: REST OF THE UNITED STATES (2009), http://www.uscourts.gov/
careers/Pay_Tables/2009_Pay_Tables/Judiciary_Salary_Plan_Pay_Tables/Base_and_Locality_Pa
y_Tables/JSP01.pdf. For salaries for specific cities, see, for example, U.S. Courts, Judicial Salary
Plan Locality Rate Pay Tables 2009, http://www.uscourts.gov/careers/Judicial_Salary_Plan_
Locality_Rate_Pay_Tables_2009.cfm (last visited Mar. 30, 2010).
261. See supra note 260.
262. The number of authorized federal judgeships for each court is set by statute. See 28
U.S.C. § 44 (2006) (authorizing judgeships for the courts of appeals); id. § 133 (authorizing
judgeships for district courts). As of March 30, 2010, there were 167 authorized active
judgeships in the regional courts of appeals (excluding the Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit) and 667 in the district courts. U.S. Courts, Federal Judiciary Judges and Judgeships,
http://www.uscourts.gov/judges.htm (last visited Mar. 30, 2010) (linking to Authorized
Judgeships). In contrast, as of August 16, 2009, the active circuit judges employed 468 full-time
equivalent law clerks (410 term law clerks, fifty-eight career law clerks). E-mail from Gary
Bowden, Admin. Office of U.S. Courts, to author (Sept. 20, 2009) (on file with the Duke Law
Journal). Active circuit judges also employed approximately five hundred staff attorneys. See
Office of the Circuit Exec., U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, Staff Attorneys’
Offices: Allocation of Work Units FY 2009 (Mar. 4, 2009) (on file with the Duke Law Journal).
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BIA easily outweigh the slightly higher adjudicator salaries in the
federal courts.
I am not suggesting that the cost per case is currently greater at
the BIA than in the courts of appeals. Because the current norms are
single-member decisions at the BIA and three-judge panels in the
courts of appeals, and because the BIA members and their staff
attorneys have been assigned far heavier caseloads than their
respective counterparts in the courts of appeals, any comparison
based on current staffing arrangements and panel sizes would be
skewed. Those arrangements are themselves the products of
conscious policy choices. Whether appellate adjudication of removal
orders lies with the BIA, the courts of appeals, my proposed Article
III Court of Appeals for Immigration, or any other tribunal to which
Congress wishes to grant jurisdiction, Congress could choose
whatever staffing levels and panel sizes it thinks optimal. A fair
comparison, therefore, must assume a constant caseload per
adjudicator, a constant caseload per staff attorney or law clerk, and a
constant panel size. Of course, except for the salaries of the federal
Article III judges, the salary ranges of the relevant personnel could
also be changed. At least under the current salary ranges, the data
supplied above demonstrate that, for a given total caseload, a given
number of adjudicators and support staff, and a given panel size, BIA
review, surprisingly, is more expensive than court of appeals review.
Positing a given total caseload, however, assumes that the
current rate of appeal from the immigration judges’ decisions to the
263
BIA (approximately 30 percent in fiscal year 2008) will carry over to
appeals from the proposed ALJs for Immigration to the proposed
U.S. Court of Appeals for Immigration. In fact, the rate at which the
decisions of immigration judges or their successors are appealed
might either increase or decrease. On the one hand, future increases
in immigration enforcement could increase the total number of
immigration judge decisions and therefore the total number of
appeals. In addition, the drop in the rate of appeals from immigration
judge decisions to the BIA from fiscal year 2004 to fiscal year 2008
264
(from 16 percent to 9 percent) might reflect the current economic
The active district judges employed another 1,379 full-time equivalent law clerks (936 term and
443 career). E-mail from Gary Bowden, supra. The Board of Immigration Appeals has only
fifteen members, 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(a)(1) (2009), but 114 staff attorneys, known as attorney
advisors, Komis, supra note 73, at 2.
263. See supra note 49.
264. EOIR, supra note 5, at Y1 fig.32.
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downturn, which presumably diminishes the incentive to fight for the
right to remain at the same time that it renders legal services less
affordable. If this theory is accurate, then future economic recovery
could restore the appeal rate to its historic levels. Alternatively,
perhaps the drop in the rate of appeals to the BIA reflects the faster
BIA turnaround time, which arguably has dampened the incentive to
file BIA appeals for the purpose of delaying removal. If so, then any
increase in the future appellate turnaround time could trigger a rise in
the appeal rate. Still another possibility is that immigration judges,
stung by the criticisms of their inconsistent asylum approval rates,
have responded with more favorable asylum rulings, in which event
one would expect the pool of asylum denials to decrease generally
and, moreover, for those asylum applications that immigration judges
deny to be less likely to contain a basis for appeal. In that scenario, a
future decrease in immigration judges’ asylum approval rates could
raise the rate of appeals. Finally, as Professor Lenni Benson has
suggested, perhaps the drop in the rate of appeals reflects an increase
in the number of in absentia removal orders entered by immigration
judges. In absentia orders are less likely to be appealed because the
265
immigrant might not learn of the order in time to appeal. If so, then
a change in the proportion of in absentia orders could trigger a
corresponding change in the appeal rates.
The relevant question, however, is not whether the rates of
appeals from the decisions of immigration judges or their successors
are likely to increase or decrease in the future. Rather, the critical
question is whether the rate of appeals is likely to be greater if the
BIA is replaced by the proposed Court of Appeals for Immigration
than it would be if appeals remain with the BIA. The answer to that
question is uncertain. On the one hand, perhaps the drop in the rate
of appeals to the BIA from 2004 to 2008 reflects a lack of confidence
in that tribunal; based on that assumption, substituting an Article III
court for the BIA might increase the rate of future appeals. That
causal link seems shaky, however. The two major events that might
be expected to have diminished immigrants’ confidence in the BIA
were the 2002 BIA procedural reforms and the purge of the more
266
immigrant-friendly BIA members in 2003. As discussed earlier, the
effects of that loss of confidence manifested themselves in
dramatically higher rates of petitions for review of BIA decisions
265. See Benson, supra note 7, at 417.
266. See supra notes 105–08.
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from just before to just after those years—not in the period 2004 to
2008. There is no evidence that confidence in the BIA further eroded
during the latter period.
On the other hand, there are reasons to expect a lower rate of
appeals under my proposal than under the current system. First,
converting the current immigration judges, who work under the
supervision of one of the opposing parties—the U.S. government—
into an independent adjudicatory tribunal should bolster confidence
267
in the original decisions. Second, those who lack access to counsel
might find it more intimidating to appeal to a full-fledged federal
court than to appeal to an administrative tribunal. As discussed in
Section D.1.c, the goal will be to make the procedures of the new
court informal and accessible, but whether the perception will track
the reality is uncertain. I therefore assume that, with a constant
caseload and constant total staffing, the existing salary structure would
make review by the proposed Article III immigration court more
economical than review by the BIA.
A second, and perhaps even more compelling, source of savings
is that the proposed bill would reduce the number of appellate rounds
from two to one. Thus, it is not just a matter of substituting one round
for a more expensive round; the one round of review would replace a
more expensive round plus another round.
The precise amount of savings from eliminating the BIA is hard
to estimate. Regrettably, EOIR is unable to disaggregate its
268
approximately $300 million budget into component units. In a
carefully prepared estimate, however, Russell Wheeler has estimated
269
the fiscal year 2010 cost of the BIA at $96 million. Even so, he is
skeptical that these savings would exceed the annual cost of a new
U.S. Court of Appeals for Immigration, if it is staffed with enough
judges to handle its expected caseload. He estimates the latter cost at
between $92 million and $105 million under different sets of
270
assumptions, and he is very likely right. Again, however, those
estimates reflect Congress’s historic willingness to give the federal
267. Judge Marks has offered a variant of this argument. She has suggested that restoring
the independence of the immigration judges (through creation of an Article I immigration
court) should enhance immigrants’ confidence in the original decisions, thus decreasing the rate
of appeals from the BIA (or a successor tribunal) to the courts of appeals. Marks, supra note 7,
at 4.
268. Komis, supra note 73, at item 11.
269. Wheeler, supra note 170, at 1862.
270. Id. at 1862–63.
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courts more resources per case than the BIA. If the cost per case is
currently lower at the BIA than it is in the courts of appeals, it is
because of conscious policy choices. For a given caseload per judge
and a given ratio of law clerks and staff attorneys to judges—which I
maintain is the relevant consideration—it remains true that BIA
adjudication is more expensive than federal court adjudication
because of the salary structures just discussed. A fortiori, the
combination of BIA adjudication and federal court adjudication is
more expensive than the latter would be if it were the sole round of
appellate review.
At any rate, the present proposal contains a third source of cost
savings. One fewer round of adjudication also means fewer
prosecutorial expenses. The annual salary range of the ICE assistant
chief counsels who currently represent the government in BIA
271
272
appeals is $49,544 to $127,604, plus locality pay. There are 712
full-time equivalent ICE assistant chief counsels handling removal
hearings and BIA appeals, and the bulk of their time is spent on
273
removal hearings before the immigration judges. Under the present
proposal, that use of their time would not change, but they would no
longer need to spend additional time on BIA appeals. Wheeler
predicts that, even if the Justice Department no longer prosecutes
BIA appeals, it would argue that its current staffing levels will still be
274
required for other immigration-related matters. I agree. If that
prediction pans out, however, it would not destroy anticipated
savings. It would mean only that the resources saved from the
elimination of BIA appeals could be reallocated to more productive
work, such as litigating the appeals that would now be filed in the new
appeals court. At present, 239 attorneys situated in the Justice
Department’s Office of Immigration Litigation, with average annual
275
salaries of $123,000, litigate immigration cases in the federal courts.

271. The pay grades of the ICE assistant chief counsels range from GS-11, step 1 to GS-15,
step 10. E-mail from Peter Vincent, supra note 10. Effective January 2009, the annual salaries
for those ranks are $49,544 and $127,604, respectively. U.S. OFFICE OF PERS. MGMT., SALARY
TABLE 2009-GS (2009), available at http://opm.gov/flsa/oca/09tables/pdf/gs.pdf.
272. See U.S. OFFICE OF PERS. MGMT., COMPLETE SET OF LOCALITY PAY TABLES (2009),
available at http://opm.gov/flsa/oca/09tables/pdf/saltbl.pdf.
273. E-mail from Peter Vincent, supra note 10.
274. Wheeler, supra note 170, at 1863.
275. Telephone Interview with Juan P. Osuna, Deputy Assistant Attorney Gen., Civil Div.,
U.S. Dep’t of Justice (Aug. 26, 2009).
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Fourth, as discussed later in this Section, the elimination of one
appellate round would shorten the elapsed time from the start of
removal proceedings to the finish. In fiscal year 2008, some 48 percent
of all the immigrants in completed removal proceedings were being
276
detained at government expense. As noted later in this Section, the
average elapsed time for BIA appeals in which the immigrants are
detained is ninety-five days. Thus, the dropoff in elapsed time from
eliminating the BIA would reduce detention costs significantly.
This cost analysis is crude, but it suggests that the proposal would
substantially reduce the total fiscal cost of appellate review of
removal orders. What could be done with these cost savings? One
option is to do nothing. The consolidation could simply be conceived
as a cost-cutting device or as a way to free up funds for unrelated
national needs. My view is that even under that approach the other
benefits described in this Section would make the immigration
adjudication system stronger than it is today. Given the extreme
underfunding of the system, however, increasing the numbers of both
adjudicators and law clerks should be a high priority. The high stakes
for both the individuals and the general public demand no less. The
hope, therefore, would be that the savings from the elimination of the
BIA and other associated reductions in expenditures would be
reinvested in either the Office of Administrative Law Judges, the
United States Court of Appeals for Immigration, or both.
It is possible, as Wheeler points out, that Congress would be
stingier in providing resources for a freestanding immigration
adjudication system than the Department of Justice currently is in
277
allocating resources to EOIR. Precisely the opposite, however, is
also possible. Much would depend on the compositions of the
particular Congresses and the particular administrations in power at
given times. Considering the Justice Department’s law enforcement
mission, I am not convinced that there exist systematic institutional
reasons to expect the former scenario to occur more frequently than
the latter.
Finally, I cannot claim that these savings alone would be enough
to raise the quality of the immigration adjudication system to an
acceptable level. The current underresourcing is so severe that a more
realistic funding level would be required under any set of reforms.
But even the revenue-neutral approach described here would permit
276. EOIR, supra note 5, at O1 fig.23.
277. Wheeler, supra note 170, at 1853–54.
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significant enhancements. The funds could be redirected to increasing
the number of adjudicators or increasing the number of law clerks at
either the trial level, the appellate level, or both. At the appellate
level, an enlarged corps of either adjudicators or law clerks could be
directed toward reducing individual caseloads or expanding the use of
multimember panels, or both. I express no view here regarding the
optimal use of those funds; I suggest only that any of these strategies
would restore some of the lost quality to the immigration adjudication
system. Instead of two highly flawed rounds of review in which
appellate authorities are forced to decide cases after little more than
quick glances at the files and dangerous shortcuts, Congress should
redirect the same funds (and ideally additional funds) to a single
round of high-quality review.
5. Elapsed Time. By eliminating one step in the process, this
proposal would do more than save money. It would also reduce the
elapsed time from the start of proceedings to their conclusion.
Elapsed time is important for several reasons. As previously noted, 48
percent of the immigrants in removal proceedings are detained
278
279
pending final determinations. EOIR prioritizes these cases, but
priorities that encompass almost one-half of the cases can have only
limited effects. Former BIA Chair Juan Osuna has noted that BIA
policy is to decide all appeals involving detained immigrants within
150 days and has said that, in practice, appeals by detained
280
immigrants have taken an average of ninety-five days to complete.
Eliminating BIA review would thus save substantial time. Reducing
time in detention, in turn, has obvious benefits. In addition to
reducing fiscal costs and minimizing the loss of individual liberty,
decreasing detention times would free up beds that could be used for
immigrants who are most likely either to abscond or to threaten
public safety.
Moreover, whether an immigrant is in detention or not, delay is
detrimental to the public interest. If the individual is indeed
deportable, and is either ineligible for, or undeserving of,
278. See supra text accompanying note 276.
279. See Maria Baldini-Potermin, Practice Before the Board of Immigration Appeals: Recent
Roundtable and Additional Practice Tips, 86 INTERPRETER RELEASES 2009, 2010 (2009)
(summarizing information shared by Juan Osuna, the then-chair of the BIA); cf. Komis, supra
note 73, at 4 (listing variables, including detention, that affect the processing times for removal
proceedings).
280. Baldini-Potermin, supra note 279, at 2010.
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discretionary relief, the public has an interest in speeding removal. If
the person is detained, delay increases the public cost. If the person is
at large, that person’s continued presence in the United States is
detrimental to the public interest for whatever reasons prompted
Congress to make the particular conduct a ground for deportation.
Conversely, if the removal order is ultimately determined to be
erroneous and the individual in fact has a legal right to remain, the
person deserves freedom as soon as possible. Either way, delay is
harmful.
6. Flexibility. The variability of appellate caseloads demands
flexibility in the system for assigning judges to cases. Appellate
281
caseloads fluctuate for numerous reasons. The total number of
appealable trial-level decisions can increase or decrease with changes
in migration flows or changes in the law enforcement priorities of
particular administrations. Thus, even a constant rate of appeal will
lead to either more or fewer total appeals. The rate of appeal can also
change. The resources allocated to the trial phase of the process, as
well as the composition of the trial bench, might influence the
outcomes of trial-level decisions or the parties’ perceptions of either
the accuracy of those outcomes or the fairness of the procedures. Any
of these factors has the potential to alter the parties’ inclinations to
appeal. Consequently, long-term future immigration appellate
caseloads are impossible to predict.
Flexibility, therefore, is critical. A court staffed by specialized
Article I judges would be hard pressed to supply that flexibility,
because specialist adjudicators are not easily transferred to other
adjudicative roles. The same would be true if an immigration
appellate court were staffed by specialized Article III judges who
were originally appointed specifically to that court and permanently
assigned there. The present proposal, in contrast, offers the requisite
flexibility. If future immigration appellate caseloads substantially
decline, fewer judges would be designated for the temporary
assignments to the new court, and at any rate those already assigned
would soon return to their district or regional appellate courts.
7. Centralization. The effects that have been described to this
point—the depoliticization of the entire adjudication process, the
retention of both generalist and specialist insights at the appellate
281. See supra notes 263–67 and accompanying text.
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level, the cost savings and efficiencies, the speeding of the process,
and the flexibility of arrangements—have all been presented as
important benefits of the proposed restructuring. One other element
of this proposal, appellate centralization, has more mixed effects. At
present, all appeals go to a single tribunal (the BIA), and some of
them are further reviewed by a network of nationally dispersed courts
of appeals. My proposal would direct all appeals to a single
centralized court. Centralization would bring additional benefits, but
it would also impose costs.
On the benefit side, routing all appeals to the same court would
theoretically promote uniform outcomes. When the regional courts of
appeals share jurisdiction over the same subject matter, as they do
today, splits of authority inevitably occur. To that extent, the
principle of equal treatment for similarly situated individuals is
sacrificed. In immigration law, a field in which courts like to
emphasize the importance of the nation speaking with a single voice,
divergent outcomes are sometimes assumed to have adverse foreign
282
policy implications. In asylum cases, the extreme inconsistency that
recent empirical studies have revealed provides another reason to
283
seek out centralizing influences.
Still, I resist the temptation to tout the uniformity benefits of my
proposal. Though the immigration opinions of the various regional
courts of appeals can indeed diverge, the same is true of all the other
subject areas over which those courts have jurisdiction. There is no
reason to expect greater divergence in immigration than in other
areas. The notion that divergence is especially problematic in
immigration cases because of their potential to affect foreign relations
is plausible in theory, but I have argued in a different context that the
likelihood of a given immigration case interfering significantly with
284
U.S. foreign relations is highly remote in practice. And although the
inconsistency in the asylum context is quite real, there is little
likelihood that divisions among the circuits on questions of law are

282. To hold that the federal government (not the states) has the exclusive power to
regulate immigration, for example, the Supreme Court has extolled the importance of
nationwide uniformity. See, e.g., Henderson v. Mayor of N.Y., 92 U.S. 259, 273 (1876) (arguing
that the immigration laws should be the same in all cities); Chy Lung v. Freeman, 92 U.S. 275,
279–80 (1876) (arguing that a lack of uniformity in immigration laws could result in one state
embroiling the entire nation in disputes with other nations).
283. See supra note 71 and accompanying text.
284. See Stephen H. Legomsky, Immigration Law and the Principle of Plenary
Congressional Power, 1984 SUP. CT. REV. 255, 261–69.
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major culprits. First, the asylum inconsistencies have occurred within
the same circuits and even among judges within the same immigration
285
courts. Further, the main issues in asylum cases have been fact
questions—in particular, assessments of the applicants’ credibility—
286
not questions of law that can generate circuit splits.
Moreover, circuit splits can have positive benefits. They can
foster healthy discussions of opposing viewpoints and a productive
maturation process. They can also help avoid dangerous
287
concentrations of power in a single body. In addition, circuit splits
can prompt definitive, authoritative rulings from the Supreme Court.
Substituting a single appellate court sacrifices these advantages to
some extent.
Another cost of centralization is that oral argument will be less
practicable when counsel lives far away. A system of dispersed courts
reduces the average time, distance, and cost of travel for counsel.
Because the present proposal calls for temporary assignments of
district and circuit judges to a new immigration court, the assigned
judges would either have to move temporarily to a new location,
travel periodically to the immigration court, or forgo personal
interaction with their colleagues on the new court and with counsel.
Moving one’s residence for two years would disrupt the personal lives
of many judges, traveling periodically to the court adds fiscal costs,
and dispensing with either panel deliberations or oral argument
would diminish the quality of the appellate process.
My view is that some of these disadvantages are minor and that
the others are easily remedied. In the present context, the dangerous
concentration of power in a single court is less serious than it first
appears. First, the status quo effectively embodies the same feature.
The vast majority of BIA decisions are never appealed; thus, the BIA
288
typically has the last word. Even when a BIA decision is challenged

285. See Ramji-Nogales et al., supra note 7, at 328–39. Because the petition for review must
be filed in the circuit in which the removal hearing was held, 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(2) (2006),
circuit splits would not explain these inconsistencies.
286. See Palmer, supra note 38, at 977.
287. See S. Rep. No. 111-101, at 23–26 (2009), available at http://www.fas.org/irp/congress/
2009_rpt/whistle.pdf (expressing dissatisfaction with restrictive interpretations of the
Whistleblower Protection Act by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, which has
exclusive jurisdiction, and proposing to extend jurisdiction to other courts).
288. As noted earlier, immigrants petition for review in approximately 30 percent of BIA
decisions. See supra note 49.
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to BIA
in court, the combination of Chevron deference
interpretations of law and the limited scope of judicial review on
290
questions of fact and discretion results in a highly concentrated BIA
power not only to decide cases but also to shape future law. As a
result, the proposed centralization of judicial review would alter the
extent of the concentration of adjudicatory power only marginally.
Second, even if there is only one court, the heavy volume of
immigration appeals virtually guarantees that the decisions of the new
court would be diffused among a large number of judges, presumably
spanning a broad ideological spectrum.
As for the logistics, it must be remembered that the current BIA
sits in only one location, and not a very central location at that: Falls
Church, Virginia. Again, however, only a minority of the BIA
decisions are further appealed. The proposed restructuring would
therefore leave the appellate tribunal only marginally less accessible
than it is today—perhaps even more accessible if the court is situated
nearer to the geographic center of the United States and definitely
more accessible if, as suggested below, the court sits in multiple
venues. With respect to oral argument, the new arrangement also
concedes very little, because the BIA heard oral argument in only one
291
case in fiscal year 2009. Again, given that only a minority seeks
further review of BIA decisions, the vast majority of immigrants who
appeal immigration judge decisions receives no oral argument at all
under the current structure.
My proposal would allow the new court to formulate its own
criteria for oral argument, based on resources, caseload, and any
other relevant factors. If the judges choose to remain based in their
home cities rather than move temporarily to the site of the new court,
they could bunch the cases that require oral argument and travel
periodically to the new court to hear them. Judges of the regional
courts of appeals must currently do precisely that, and several circuits
encompass vast geographic areas. The Ninth Circuit ranges from
Hawaii to Alaska to Arizona, the Eighth Circuit from North Dakota
to Arkansas, the Tenth Circuit from Wyoming to Oklahoma. With
only one centralized appellate court, the travel distances admittedly
289. See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 841, 862–63 (1984).
290. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4) (making BIA factfinding “conclusive unless any reasonable
adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to the contrary,” and the attorney general’s
discretion regarding relief “conclusive unless manifestly contrary to the law and an abuse of
discretion”).
291. Komis, supra note 73, at 3.
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would be even greater, but that marginal difference must be balanced
against the reality that, for the vast majority of BIA litigants, there is
currently no oral argument at any stage of the appellate process.
292
Indeed, as a result of the current restrictions on judicial review,
many litigants lack access not only to oral argument but also to any
judicial review at all. The proposed restructuring would plug that gap.
Finally, if either travel logistics or the concentration of
adjudicatory power in a single court is nonetheless considered
problematic, Congress can choose to situate the new court in multiple
cities (perhaps three). Judges might be more inclined to relocate
temporarily if given a choice of cities. Even if they choose not to
relocate, a thoughtful selection of venues would reduce travel times
for both judges and counsel. The resulting travel burdens would thus
approach, if not quite equal, those which they experience today for
oral argument in the various regional courts of appeals. If Congress
were to establish multiple sites, it would have at least two options. It
could create multiple U.S. Courts of Appeals for Immigration,
empowering each to develop its own precedents, as the regional
courts of appeals now do, or it could simply establish multiple venues
for the same court, in much the same way each regional court of
appeals now operates internally. The former arrangement would
better address the dangerous concentration of power problem, and
either arrangement would ease the travel burdens for oral argument
or for panel deliberation. There are alternative solutions to the
logistical issues as well. One option is for the judges to ride circuit
when the occasion so demands. Videoconferencing and other
technology could address some of the distance issues.
8. Potential for Consensus. It is perhaps naïve to expect any
meaningful reform of immigration adjudication to command
consensus in the present highly charged partisan climate. This
proposal, however, presents tradeoffs that the typical opposing sides
in this debate might find worthwhile. In exchange for minor sacrifices,
each side would achieve what is most important to it.
Those who tend to prioritize the interests of the immigrant
should be pleased with the decisional independence for immigration
judges. Moreover, instead of appellate review by an administrative
tribunal whose members are appointed by, and restrained by, the
attorney general, there is a right of review by Article III judges with
292. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2); see also supra notes 34–35 and accompanying text.
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real independence. In the process, the 1996 court-stripping legislation
would be effectively neutralized, because there would be a right of
review by Article III judges in all removal cases. There are also the
combined benefits of specialized expertise and a generalist
perspective at the appellate level, again for all cases.
Those who generally prioritize the interests of the government
should similarly be receptive, because this proposal offers much of
what they have long said they want. With only one appellate round
rather than two, the process is shorter and cheaper. The
neutralization of the 1996 court stripping should not be troubling,
because review by the new court in those cases will simply replace
BIA review of those cases. Instead of every party having a right to
one round of review and some having the right to a second round,
every party will be limited to one round. The elimination of the
second round not only saves taxpayer funds, but also reduces the
293
delays that some believe incentivize frivolous appeals.
I predict that the federal judges themselves will be less than
enthusiastic about this proposal, at least initially. Some might
specifically dislike immigration cases. Specific likes and dislikes aside,
federal judges did not sign up to be specialists. Part of the lure of the
job might well have been the interesting diversity of subject matter to
which their cases would expose them. Still, at present, the circuit
judges bear the entire responsibility for deciding immigration
294
appeals; my proposal would distribute the immigration caseload
more equitably among the district judges and circuit judges.
Moreover, even those judges who are assigned to the new
immigration court despite a preference to be elsewhere will not
necessarily be hearing more immigration cases than they would
otherwise hear. They will simply be hearing the immigration cases in
a more compressed time frame. Finally, those who specialize in
immigration law know firsthand the fascinations of this extraordinary
field. After significant exposure to immigration law and an
opportunity to master its nuances, many of the judges who would not

293. As Wheeler points out, the creation of new federal judgeships, with the resulting
opportunity for one president to substantially alter the composition of the federal bench, could
pose particular political problems in an era of intense congressional partisanship. Wheeler,
supra note 170, at 1863–64. As he further notes, however, an omnibus judge bill might attract
bipartisan support if the effective date is deferred to the start of the next presidential term and
the bill is voted on before anyone could reliably predict the outcome of the next presidential
race. Id. at 1863.
294. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252.
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have chosen two-year rotations to an immigration appeals court
undoubtedly will develop a new appreciation for the subject matter
and genuine fulfillment in their experiences.
No one could responsibly argue that the BIA has contributed
nothing to the immigration adjudication process. It has disposed of
large numbers of cases cheaply and speedily, and in the process it has
295
provided twenty-five volumes of published precedent decisions that
have guided immigration judges and administrative officials for
296
seventy years. The question I pose, however, is whether the value
added by the BIA can match the gains from redirecting the funds
currently spent on two badly underresourced rounds of appellate
review into a single round of careful, high-quality review by
independent judges who combine specialist and generalist
perspectives. I believe it cannot and thus favor the consolidation the
proposal offered here would permit.
D. The Details
At the request of the U.S. Senate Subcommittee on Immigration,
Refugees and Border Security, I have prepared a draft bill that would
297
embody the proposal made in this Article. For the trial phase, the
more significant details of the draft bill concern the appointments of
the adjudicators, their jurisdiction, and the trial procedures. For the
appellate phase, the main details relate to the assignments of the
judges, their jurisdiction, the scope of review, the appellate
procedures, filing deadlines, and stays of removal pending review.
1. The Trial Phase
a. Appointments of Adjudicators. The draft bill would establish,
as an independent executive branch tribunal outside all departments
of government, the Office of the Administrative Law Judges for
Immigration (OALJI). In most respects, this office is analogous to the
existing Office of the Chief Immigration Judge. The president would
appoint, with the advice and consent of the Senate, a Chief
295. See EOIR, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Virtual Law Library, http://www.justice.gov/eoir/vll/
libindex.html (last visited Mar. 30, 2010) (containing published BIA decisions).
296. See Regulations Governing Departmental Organization and Authority, 5 Fed. Reg.
3502, 3503 (Sept. 4, 1940) (codified as amended at 8 C.F.R. pt. 1003) (creating the BIA);
Legomsky, supra note 6, at 1380 n.488 (noting that no attorney general had ever removed a BIA
member).
297. The draft bill is on file with the Duke Law Journal and is available on request.
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Administrative Law Judge for Immigration (CALJI), to serve for a
term of seven years. Instead of immigration judges, there would be
Administrative Law Judges for Immigration (ALJIs). They would be
based in various district offices around the country, just as the
immigration judges now are.
The existing immigration judges would generally be
grandfathered into the new ALJI positions, as has been done in some
298
analogous contexts. Other staff would be similarly grandfathered.
The bad apple problem discussed in Part II.B.4, however, requires a
difficult judgment call. Grandfathering everyone would extend
functional life tenure even to those current immigration judges whose
behavior renders them unfit to wield adjudicatory power. There is a
tension between the need to weed out those individuals and the
potential for selective grandfathering based on ideology. Absent
evidence that the bad apples number more than a few, one alternative
is simply to accept these few as a tradeoff for avoiding the dangers of
politicized selections. But that tradeoff would offer little solace for
the immigrants who appear before those problematic adjudicators.
The compromise I propose is to subject the grandfathering to a
specific exclusion for any current immigration judges whom a special
commission identifies as having exhibited patterns of incompetence,
bias, or unprofessional conduct. The judge in question would then
have the right to an evidentiary hearing before, and a de novo
determination by, the Merit Systems Protection Board.
The biggest changes for the trial-level adjudicators would be
those designed to assure their decisional independence and more
generally to depoliticize the adjudication process. The changes would
be reflected in the adjudicators’ organizational locations,
appointments, and terms of office. After the initial grandfathering,
the process for future appointments would be a slightly modified
version of thoughtful proposals by the ABA Commission on
Immigration and by Philip Schrag and Marshall Fitz. Both proposals
call for an independent committee that would recommend trial judge
candidates to the chief trial judge; under those proposals, the latter
would then make the final selections from the recommended list.
Congress would prescribe certain minimum qualifications (U.S.
citizenship, Bar membership, and certain experience requirements).

298. See Marks, supra note 7, at 17 & n.89 (citing Tax Court judges and Court of Claims
judges as examples).
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Beyond those minimum credentials, the committee would be
299
encouraged to consider a range of other statutorily specified factors.
Rather than confine this committee to a purely advisory role,
however, I would have it appoint the candidates directly. Its size and
diversity render unlikely the chance that candidates with extremist
views, problematic credentials, or difficult personalities will be
appointed. The alternative of allowing a single chief immigration
judge to select from a list of candidates—even if all are well
qualified—would give that one individual a broad power to shape the
long-term ideological composition of the immigration bench.
Once ALJIs are in office, I would give the CALJI the power to
300
reassign them to different district offices as caseloads change, but
only for reasons of efficiency, not as a form of discipline. The ALJIs’
terms of office would be the same as for most other ALJs; they could
be removed only for good cause and only after a Merit Systems
301
Protection Board hearing.
b. Jurisdiction. Immigration judges currently have jurisdiction
over removal hearings, including the authority to decide almost all
applications for affirmative relief commonly sought during removal
302
proceedings. They have jurisdiction over a few miscellaneous
303
decisions as well. The draft bill generally grants the same authority
to the ALJIs, but in somewhat more generic language and with a
304
specific change to the adjustment of status procedures.
299. See ABA, supra note 215, at 10–13; COMM’N ON IMMIGRATION, supra note 7, at 69;
Fitz & Schrag, supra note 7, § 103(g).
300. The chief immigration judge currently enjoys a similar power to detail immigration
judges to locations with more pressing needs. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, NO.
GAO-06-771, EXECUTIVE OFFICE FOR IMMIGRATION REVIEW: CASELOAD PERFORMANCE
REPORTING NEEDS IMPROVEMENT 17–19 (2006), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/
d06771.pdf.
301. See supra note 198.
302. 8 C.F.R. § 1240.1(a)(1) (2009). For more detail, see supra text accompanying notes 12–
23.
303. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.19 (review of ICE bond decisions); id. § 1003.23 (motions to reopen
or reconsider); id. § 1003.26 (in absentia hearings); id. § 1003.29 (continuances); id. § 1003.42
(review of credible fear determinations); id. § 1003.106 (practitioner discipline); id.
§ 1245.13(n)(2)–(3) (rescission of adjustment of status).
304. Rather than attempt to list all the various affirmative relief applications that may be
filed in removal proceedings, the draft bill defines the ALJIs’ jurisdiction more generically to
include all requests for relief or protection that the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA)
makes available to noncitizens who are inadmissible or deportable. In addition, the draft bill
addresses a nagging problem. At present, the immigration judge has the authority to decide
adjustment of status applications that are filed during removal proceedings. Id. § 1245.2(a)(1).
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c. Procedures. A few procedural rules that currently govern
305
removal proceedings are statutory. The proposed bill generally
leaves those rules intact. Most of the current procedural rules,
306
however, are embodied in the attorney general’s regulations. The
draft bill takes an analogous approach. It establishes an Executive
Committee composed of the chief ALJI and four senior ALJIs, and
authorizes it to formulate rules of procedure, adapting the notice-and307
comment requirements generally applicable to judicial rulemaking.
It enumerates several specific issues that the rules must address,
including venue, admissibility of evidence, authorization to practice
before ALJIs, and discipline of practitioners. To preserve the relative
informality of the process, the draft bill requires that the
representation rules provide for nonlawyers and that the evidentiary
rules accommodate the high percentage of pro se cases. The draft bill
also requires the ALJIs to follow the precedent decisions of the U.S.
Court of Appeals for Immigration (and the preenactment precedent
decisions of the relevant court of appeals).
One provision of the draft bill would prohibit ex parte
communications between an ALJI and a party (or counsel)
concerning a pending case. As noted earlier, the attorney general’s
current Rules of Conduct for both immigration judges and BIA
members expressly allow such ex parte communications with Justice
Department personnel, and in at least one highly publicized incident,
the former INS successfully communicated ex parte with the chief
308
immigration judge. There is no way to know how many other ex
parte communications have taken place. In the interest of fairness to
both parties, the proposed provision would expressly prohibit that
practice.

But adjustment of status usually requires approval of a visa petition, which only DHS—not the
immigration judge—currently has the authority to decide. Id. § 204.1(e)(1).To prevent the
immigration judge from granting adjustment of status, DHS often deliberately refrains from
acting on the visa petition. As a result, immigration judges have frequently had to grant multiple
continuances while they wait for DHS to act on the visa petitions, thus delaying removal
hearings for long periods of time. See, e.g., LEGOMSKY & RODRÍGUEZ, supra note 68, at 666
(excerpting an unpublished decision in which a judge criticizes INS delay). To cure that
problem, this subsection would give the immigration judge the authority to decide any familyrelated visa petition on which an adjustment of status application filed during removal
proceedings depends.
305. See, e.g., 8 U.S.C. § 1229a (2006).
306. See 8 C.F.R. § 1240.
307. See Rules Enabling Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 2071–72 (2006).
308. See supra notes 150–52, 189 and accompanying text.
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Current law requires the attorney general to issue regulations
309
spelling out the contempt powers of immigration judges. To date,
however, the attorney general has not done so, apparently because
the former INS did not want its trial attorneys subject to discipline by
310
other Department of Justice attorneys, even if the latter are judges.
Thus, immigration judges have had difficulty getting government
attorneys to meet deadlines; this difficulty has slowed final
311
dispositions. The draft bill fills that gap, conferring contempt
authority directly in language drawn partly from that used for judges
312
of the Tax Court. The same proposed provision clarifies that
government actors and private actors alike are subject to the
contempt power.
2. The Appellate Phase
a. Assignments of Judges. The draft bill would replace both the
BIA and the current role of the regional courts of appeals in
immigration cases with a new Article III U.S. Court of Appeals for
Immigration (CAI). The president, with the advice and consent of the
Senate, would appoint a chief judge of the CAI for a term of seven
years. Each circuit would assign both circuit and district judges to sit
313
on the new court for two-year terms. If the draft bill becomes law,
Congress would need to enact subsequent legislation specifying the
number of judges it wishes to authorize for the new court, as well as
any corresponding adjustments Congress wishes to make to the
number of authorized judgeships for the existing courts of appeals
and district courts. These adjustments would compensate those courts
for the judges they would be lending to the new court while
accounting for the corresponding reductions in the caseloads of the
309. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(1).
310. See Marks, supra note 7, at 10 (“[I]t was discovered that the Attorney General had
failed to [issue regulations] in large part [] because the INS objected to having its attorneys
subjected to contempt provisions by ‘other attorneys within the Department,’ even if the
attorneys do serve as judges.” (quoting KEENER & SLAVIN, supra note 187, at 87)).
311. See Immigration Reform and the Reorganization of Homeland Defense, supra note 187,
at 75–76 (recommending that the INS be required to “meet timely pre-trial deadlines . . . or
notify the court and parties of delays”); KEENER & SLAVIN, supra note 187, at 87 (discussing
delay by the INS).
312. See 26 U.S.C. § 7456 (2006) (administration of oaths and procurement of testimony in
the Tax Court).
313. To stagger the appointments in a way that would avoid a complete turnover of judges
every two years, a transition provision prescribes three-year assignments for one-half of the first
cohort of judges.
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courts of appeals. To aid Congress in those decisions, the draft bill
would require the Judicial Conference of the United States to study
the likely needs of both the new court and the courts from which the
assigned judges are drawn and report its recommendations to
Congress by a specified date.
The draft bill offers a formula for determining how many judges
each circuit would be required to contribute. Initially, I considered
proposing that the allocations be proportional to the number of
immigration judges who sit in each circuit at the date of enactment,
with periodic future adjustments. My thinking was that the number of
immigration judges in a circuit provides a rough measure of the
number of removal cases the circuits would otherwise be receiving,
and therefore an approximation of the caseload reduction that each
circuit would experience as a result of the transfer of its cases to the
new court. This approach is problematic, however, because petitions
314
for review of removal cases are filed only in the courts of appeals.
Thus, the caseloads of those courts would drop while the district
courts, which would lose the bulk of the judges, would not experience
any offsetting caseload reductions.
Instead, therefore, the proposal would make each circuit’s
contributions proportional to the number of active Article III circuit
315
and district judges in that circuit. The Judicial Council of each
circuit would then select the assigned judges, after a recommendation
from the chief judge of the court of appeals for the circuit. To
preserve a generalist perspective, only active Article III judges with at
least three years of service on federal courts of general jurisdiction
would be eligible for these two-year assignments. No judge could be
assigned to more than one two-year assignment without consent, and
there are special provisions for uncompleted assignments.
Assignment to the new court would have no effect on a judge’s pay.
Subject to certain conditions, the draft bill also provides for ad hoc
assignments of both active and senior district and circuit judges when
temporary needs arise.
b. Jurisdiction. The BIA now has jurisdiction over appeals from
immigration judge decisions in removal proceedings, as well as
314. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252.
315. The Judicial Council of each circuit comprises the chief judge of the court of appeals
and some of the district and circuit judges of the circuit. 28 U.S.C. § 332(a)(1) (2006). I must
acknowledge here the logistical and political challenges that the selection of judges would
inevitably entail. See Wheeler, supra note 170, at 1849–50, 1863–64.
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jurisdiction over a number of miscellaneous matters. In substituting
the CAI for both the BIA and the regional courts of appeals, the draft
bill would confer on the new court a jurisdiction roughly similar to
that of the current BIA. The practical effect would be to restore the
most important Article III appellate jurisdiction Congress stripped
away in 1996—review of most discretionary decisions and review of
317
orders removing most criminal offenders. Both the immigrant and
the government would have the right to appeal. The CAI would also
have the discretion to accept jurisdiction over issues that ALJIs
certify to it.
c. Scope of Review. At present, the BIA reviews immigration
judge decisions de novo, except that it may not set aside findings of
318
fact unless they are “clearly erroneous.” The statutory provisions on
the scope of review by the courts of appeals are both more complex
and more unusual. The reviewing court may set aside an
administrative finding of fact only if “any reasonable adjudicator
319
would be compelled to conclude to the contrary.” An exclusion
320
decision “is conclusive unless manifestly contrary to law.” A
decision to deny asylum in the exercise of discretion (as distinguished
from a finding that the applicant is statutorily ineligible for asylum) is
“conclusive unless manifestly contrary to the law and an abuse of
321
discretion.” There is no provision that spells out the standard of
review of those other discretionary decisions for which review is not
barred. A finding that corroborating evidence was available to an
asylum applicant but not produced must stand unless “a reasonable

316. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(b) (2009) (establishing the appellate jurisdiction of the BIA).
317. See Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L. No.
104-208, div. C, § 306, 110 Stat. 3009-546, 3009-608 (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C.
§ 1252(a)(2)(B)–(C) (2006)). The draft bill does not disturb some of the other current
restrictions on judicial review, such as the limitations on review of in absentia orders, see 8
U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(5)(D), the bars on challenging removal orders via habeas corpus, injunctions,
class actions, and other alternatives to petitions for review, see id. § 1252(a)(5); id. § 1252(b)(9);
id. § 1252(f), the limitations on review of expedited removal orders, see id. § 1252(a)(2)(A); id.
§ 1252(e), and the bar on challenging asylum denials based on missed filing deadlines, see id.
§ 1158(a)(3). Similarly, the draft bill does not alter the various special removal procedures
sprinkled throughout the Immigration and Nationality Act. See generally LEGOMSKY &
RODRÍGUEZ, supra note 68, at 806–15 (describing the exceptions to the usual removal
procedures, such as for expedited removal, criminal cases, and in absentia hearings).
318. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(d)(3).
319. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B).
320. Id. § 1252(b)(4)(C).
321. Id. § 1252(b)(4)(D).
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trier of fact is compelled to conclude that such corroborating evidence
322
is unavailable.”
These latter rules, apart from being needlessly complex and
difficult to interpret, reflect Congress’s intentions to narrow the
judicial role. These rules were enacted, however, in a world in which
the courts of appeals review final orders after the BIA has already
reviewed those same orders. With the abolition of the BIA, the new
CAI would provide the only opportunity for appellate review of the
trial-level removal orders. The draft bill therefore prescribes the
familiar standards generally applicable to judicial review of formal
administrative decisions—the substantial evidence standard for
findings of fact, the “arbitrary, capricious, [or otherwise] an abuse of
discretion” standard for discretionary decisions, and de novo review
323
for conclusions of law. The draft bill would leave intact the current
324
provision confining the reviewing court to the administrative record.
d. Procedures.
The federal Rules Enabling Act already
authorizes all courts established by Congress to “prescribe
325
[procedural] rules for the conduct of their business.” The Judicial
Conference of the United States reviews those rules for compliance
326
with federal law. The rulemaking process must include opportunity
for public notice and comment unless there is an immediate need to
327
proceed more quickly. Subject to these constraints, the draft bill
authorizes a majority of the active judges of the CAI to exercise this
rulemaking power. With the abolition of the BIA, it will become
important for the CAI to keep the rules simple enough for pro se
appellants to navigate. For the same reason, the proposed CAI would

322. Id. § 1252(b)(4).
323. See 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (2006) (setting forth the scope of judicial review of agency
action); ABA, Resolution 114D Adopted by the House of Delegates 4–5 (Feb. 8–9, 2010),
available at http://www.abanet.org/leadership/2010/midyear/ daily_jourmal/114D.pdf; COMM’N
ON IMMIGRATION, supra note 7, at 36. Ordinarily, reviewing courts must defer to administrative
tribunals’ reasonable interpretations of the statutes they administer. See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v.
Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 844 (1984) (“[A] court may not substitute its own
construction of a statutory provision for a reasonable interpretation made by the administrator
of an agency.”). Because the CAI would itself be a specialized court, however, there is little
reason for it to accord deference to the legal conclusions of the ALJIs. The draft bill leaves that
decision to the courts.
324. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(A) (limiting review to the administrative record).
325. 28 U.S.C. § 2071(a) (2006).
326. Id. § 331.
327. Id. § 2071(e).
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be wise to permit representation by appropriate categories of
328
nonattorneys, as EOIR currently does.
e. Filing Deadline.
Current law imposes thirty-day filing
deadlines for both appeals to the BIA and petitions for review in the
329
courts of appeals. The draft bill would prescribe a similar thirty-day
filing deadline for appeals to the CAI, but with one significant
change. Rather than make the thirty-day deadline absolute, it would
give the new court the discretion to extend the deadline upon a
showing of “exceptional circumstances explaining the late filing” or
330
otherwise “in the interest of justice.” The latter would apply, for
example, if an appellant could not offer sufficiently compelling
reasons for missing the deadline but when the facts are so extreme
that the court regards removal without review as a sanction grossly
disproportionate to the appellant’s filing error. A request for
permission to extend the filing deadline, however, would not
automatically stay removal.
f. Stays of Removal Pending Judicial Review. Currently, a
removal order by an immigration judge is automatically stayed until
the thirty-day filing deadline for appealing to the BIA has lapsed (or
appeal has been affirmatively waived). The automatic stay continues
331
while a BIA appeal is pending. In contrast, an appeal to the BIA of
an order denying reopening or reconsideration does not stay removal
332
unless the BIA in its discretion orders otherwise.
Until 1996, somewhat analogous rules applied to petitions for
review in the courts of appeals. Service of the petition for review
automatically stayed removal until the court decided the case, unless
333
the court directed otherwise. Current law reverses that default
option; a petition for review no longer stays removal unless the court
334
335
in its discretion orders otherwise. In Nken v. Holder, the Supreme
328. See 8 C.F.R. § 1292 (2009) (permitting representation by listed categories of
nonlawyers).
329. See id. § 1003.38(b) (addressing appeals to the BIA); 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(1) (describing
petitions for review in the courts of appeals).
330. For a somewhat similar recommendation, see ABA, supra note 323, at 7 (proposing a
sixty-day filing deadline, with the discretion to grant a thirty-day extension upon a showing of
“excusable neglect or good cause”); COMM’N ON IMMIGRATION, supra note 7, at 37.
331. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.6(a).
332. Id. § 1003.6(b).
333. 8 U.S.C. § 1105a(a)(3) (1994).
334. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(3)(B) (2006).
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Court interpreted the statute as contemplating for this purpose the
traditional test for enforcing orders pending appellate review—a
balancing test that weighs the likelihood of success on the merits, the
harm that could result from the denial of a stay, any potential injury
336
to the opposing party if a stay is granted, and the public interest.
Under the current system, therefore, petitions for review are
routinely coupled with motions for stays of removal. As a result, the
court of appeals normally has to review each case twice—once to see
whether the arguments have enough merit to justify staying removal
until a final decision can be rendered, and then again, months later,
when it decides the merits of the case directly.
Given this inefficiency, there would be strong reasons to return
to the pre-1996 law even if nothing else were changed. The benefits of
making that change become even more compelling under the
proposed bill because current law automatically stays removal
pending the BIA appeal, and the proposed bill would eliminate BIA
appeals entirely. Without an automatic stay during appellate review
by the CAI, therefore, those who challenge their removal orders
could be erroneously expelled to far corners of the globe without any
review of their removal orders. For asylum claimants, the dangers are
even greater. They could be returned erroneously to countries in
which they face persecution, torture, or even death before any
tribunal has reviewed the order of removal. Moreover, because the
consolidation of appellate review from two rounds to one decreases
the duration of the appellate process, the proposal simultaneously
reduces the total delay that an immigrant could achieve by exercising
his or her appellate rights. Again, even with this change, the new
court would have the discretion to deny a stay pending removal, an
action it might well be inclined to take in cases of obvious abuse of
the court process. The only change would be that removal without
review would require an affirmative act by the court, as it did until
1996. Further, the proposed stay (with judicial discretion to dissolve
the stay) would apply only to appeals from removal decisions—not,
for example, to appeals from denials of motions to reopen or
reconsider, to the filing of requests for extensions of time in which to

335. Nken v. Holder, 129 S. Ct. 1749 (2009).
336. See id. at 1760–62.
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to any of the other
appeal, or, with one minor exception,
miscellaneous orders over which the CAI would have jurisdiction.
CONCLUSION
Adjudication is one small piece of the immigration puzzle, but it
is a piece that has suffered from longstanding neglect. The problems
are serious. They affect the fairness of the procedures, the accuracy
and consistency of the results, and the acceptability of the system to
the parties and the public. Inadequate resources, procedural
shortcuts, politicization, and a few bad apples are at the root of these
problems.
Few people today would dispute that the immigration
adjudication system is fundamentally flawed, but the warring
ideological camps differ dramatically as to how much different
problems matter and how best to solve them. My goal is to propose a
restructuring that would meaningfully address the most worrisome
deficiencies in a manner that all sides would view as a substantial
improvement over the status quo. A workable consensus will require
compromises and concessions from all sides. For this to happen,
however, a proposed reform will have to enable all sides to meet the
specific objectives they regard as most compelling, while allowing
each side to limit its concessions to those it can live with.
The restructuring proposed here is offered in that spirit. At the
trial level, it would remove the current corps of immigration judges
from the Department of Justice and situate them in an independent
executive branch office. The adjudicators would be ALJs, appointed
collectively by actors insulated from the political process. They would
have the job security essential to their decisional independence and
would be free of day-to-day supervision and control by a department
whose primary mission is law enforcement. Most of the current
immigration judges would be grandfathered into the new positions.
The larger component of the proposed reform is the appellate
phase. Both the BIA and the current role of the regional courts of
appeals in immigration cases would be abolished. In their place, the
proposal would establish an Article III immigration court staffed by
district and circuit judges on two-year assignments. Judges could not

337. The one exception would be to allow an automatic stay when an immigrant appeals an
order rescinding adjustment of status under 8 U.S.C. § 1256—again, unless the CAI directs
otherwise.
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be assigned to the new court until they had served at least three years
on federal courts of general jurisdiction.
The benefits would be ample. At the trial level, it would
depoliticize (to the extent possible) the hiring, judging, and
supervision and control of immigration adjudicators. It would
consolidate the two current, largely duplicative, and badly
underfunded rounds of appellate review into a single high-quality
round. In the process, it would restore the Article III jurisdiction that
Congress stripped away in 1996. The consolidation would save tax
dollars and speed the removal process. Speeding the process, in turn,
would not only reduce the fiscal and personal liberty costs associated
with prolonged detention, but would also diminish what some believe
is a meaningful incentive to file frivolous appeals to delay removal.
The proposal would achieve this consolidation without sacrificing
either specialized expertise or a generalist perspective. Importantly,
the proposed restructuring would also add flexibility, because the
district and circuit judges who would be staffing the new court could
be reassigned to their home courts if caseload fluctuations so require.
The major disadvantages would be the loss of the productive
discourse that can result from differences of opinion among appellate
courts and the concentration of power in a single tribunal. For
reasons this Article has offered, those disadvantages are minor and
easily remedied.
Tensions among the multiple goals of adjudication are inevitable.
As this proposal illustrates, however, those tensions need be neither
polarizing nor paralyzing. Efficiency and acceptability can coexist
peacefully with procedural fairness and substantive justice. In the
immigration adjudication system, the problem has not been merely
that some of these objectives have been traded off to promote others.
Rather, the immigration adjudication system has accomplished the
improbable feat of simultaneously underserving all of these goals.
These failings are both needless and unacceptable—the former
because the present proposal offers a way for all sides to have 90
percent of their cake and eat it too, the latter because the vital human
and public interests at stake demand a justice system worthy of its
name.

